﻿ Basic Problems of Phenomenology 238 238
Problem of Ontological Difference [337-338]

motion that is encountered in the horizon of the earlier and later (motion encountered with regard to the before and after). At first it might be said that this definition of time makes the phenomenon inquired into more opaque than accessible. The first point in the definition implies that time is something we find before us in connection with motion, as pertaining to something that moves as a moving thing, οὔτε κίνησις οὔτ᾿ ἄνευ κινήσεως.15 Let us take a simple example. A vertical rod moves on the blackboard from left to right. We can also let it move in the manner of a rotation with the lower end as pivot. Time is something about the motion, showing itself to us in connection with a moving thing. If we imagine this rod to move or to rotate then we can ask, Where is time here, if it is supposed to pertain to the motion? It is certainly not a property of this rod, not anything corporeal, not heavy, not colored, not hard, not anything that belongs to its extension and continuity (συνεχές) as such; it is not something, not a piece of the rod's manifold of points, if we think of the rod as a line. Also, however, Aristotle does not in fact say that time is something connected with the moving thing as such but rather with its motion. But what is the motion of the rod? We say "its change of place, the transition from one place to another-whether in the sense of simple forward motion or continued motion from one point to the other." Time is supposed to be something relating to the motion and not to the moving thing. If we follow the continued movement of the rod, whether in the sense of rotation or the other motion, will we then find time belonging to this continued movement itself? Does it adhere to the motion as such? If we stop the motion, we say that time continues. Time goes on while the motion ceases. Thus time is not motion, and the rod's motion is not itself time. Aristotle also does not say that time is κίνησις, but κινήσεως τι, something close to, connected with motion. But how? The motion here is the transition of the rod from one place to the other. The moving thing, as moving, is always present at some one place. Is time at these places or is it even these places themselves? Obviously not, for if the moving thing has run through the places in its movement, these places are, as such, still existent as definite locations. But the time at which the rod was at this or that place has passed. The place remains, time goes by. Where and how, then, is time at, with, the motion? We say that during its motion the moving thing is always at a place at a time. The motion is in time, intratemporal. Is time then something like a container, into which motion is put? And if time is always to be met with in connection with motion, is this container then something that carries motion as such along with it like a snail its shell? But when the rod is resting we again ask where time is. Do we find nothing of time in the thing qua resting? Or something? We say "The rod was at rest

15. Aristotle, Physica, 219b 1. ["Neither movement nor independent." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]