﻿ Basic Problems of Phenomenology 243 243
§19. Time and Temporality [344-345]

experience along with it συνεχές, continuity, and in this continuity itself ἐκ τινος εἰς τι, dimension in the original sense, stretching out (extension). In the case of change of place the extension is locally-spatial. Aristotle expresses this set of circumstances in reverse order when he says that ἀκολούθει τῷ μεγέθει ἡ κίνησις,18 motion follows (comes in the wake of) dimension (extension). This proposition should be understood not ontically but ontologically. It does not mean that a motion proceeds ontically from stretch or continuity, that dimension has motion consequent to it. To say that motion follows continuity or follows dimension means that by the very nature of motion as such dimensionality, and thus continuity, precedes it. Extension and continuity are already implicit in motion. They are earlier than motion in the sense of being a priori conditions of motion itself. Where there is motion, there μέγεθος and συνεχές (συνέχεια) are already thought along with it a priori. But this does not signify that motion is identical with extension (space) and continuity, which is clear already from the fact that not every motion is a change of place, a spatial motion, but nevertheless is determined by the ἐκ τινος εἰς τι. Extension here has a broader sense than specifically spatial dimension. Motion follows continuity, and continuity follows extendedness. Ἀκολούθει expresses the foundational a priori connection of motion with continuity and extendedness. Aristotle employs ἀκολονθεῖν in other investigations, too, in this ontological signification. So far as time is κινήσεως τι, something connected with motion, this means that in thinking time, motion or rest is always thought along with it. In Aristotelian language, time follows, is in succession to, motion. Aristotle says directly: ὁ χρόνος ἀκολονθεῖ τῇ κινήσει.19 For change of place the sequence is as follows: place-manifold—(space) extension—continuity—motion—time. Viewed backward from time this

18. Physica, 5, 219a 11. ["But what is moved is moved from something to something, and all magnitude is continuous. Therefore the movement goes with the magnitude. Because the magnitude is continuous, the movement too must be continuous, and if the movement, then the time; for the time that has passed is always thought to be in proportion to the movement." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

19. Ibid., 219b 23. [A sense of the difficulty of reading this passage may be derived from noting how two translations deal with it. "But the 'now' corresponds to the body that is carried along, as time corresponds to the motion. For it is by means of the body that is carried along that we become aware of the 'before and after' in the motion, and if we regard these as countable we get the now." Trans. Hardie and Gaye. "And as time follows the analogy of movement, so does the 'now' of time follow the analogy of the moving body, since it is by the moving body that we come to know the before-and-after in movement, and it is in virtue of the countableness of its before-and-afters that the 'now' exists." A note gives an alternative translation of the last two words: "the 'now' is the before and after, qua countable." In Aristotle, The Physics, trans. Philip H. Wicksteed and Francis M. Cornford. 2 vols. (London: William Heinemann; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), vol. 1, pp. 389-391. All further references to the Wicksteed and Cornford translation of the Physica are to this edition, vol. 1.]