means: if time is something connected with motion, then the genuine connection is thought along with time. And this plainly does not say that time is identical with any of the phenomena thus thought in connection with it.

Unless the ontological sense of akolouthein has been comprehended, the Aristotelian definition of time remains unintelligible. Or else defective interpretations occur, for example that of Bergson, who said that time as Aristotle understands it is space. He was misled into adopting this inadequate interpretation because he took continuity in the narrower sense of the extensional magnitude of space. Aristotle does not reduce time to space nor does he define it merely with the aid of space, as though some spatial determination entered into the definition of time. He only wants to show that and how time is something connected with motion. To this end, however, it becomes necessary to recognize what is already experienced in and with the experience of motion and how time becomes visible in what is thus experienced.

To see more precisely the sense in which time follows upon motion or motion's stretching out, we have to clarify even further for ourselves the experience of motion. The thoughts of motion, continuity, extension—and in the case of change of place, place—are interwoven with the experience of time. When we follow a motion, we encounter time in the process without expressly apprehending it or explicitly intending it. In the concrete experience of motions we keep primarily to the moving thing, the φερόμενον; ὁ ten kinesin gnorizomen;²⁰ we see the motion in connection with the moving thing. To see motion purely as such is not easy: tode γάρ τι to φερόμενον, he δὲ κίνησις ou;²¹ the moving thing is always a this-here, a definite entity, while the motion itself does not have a specifically individualized character that would give it its own special stamp. The moving thing is given for us in its individuation and thisness, but motion as such is not given in that way. In experiencing motion we keep to the moving thing, and we thus see the motion with the moving thing but do not see it as such.

Corresponding to the way we bring motion closer to ourselves by focusing on the moving thing is the way we experience continuity in the elements constituting something continuous, a continuum, points in the point manifold of a line. When we experience motion we focus on the moving thing and the particular place from which it makes its transition to another place. In following a motion we experience it in the horizon of a conjointly encountered series of locations on a continuous path. We experience the motion when we see the particular moving thing in its transition from one

20. Cf. Physica, 5, 219b 17.

21. Ibid, 219b 30.