place to another. We see how it goes from there to here, from a from-there to a to-here. This calls for more precise determination.
It could be said that change of place is a traversing of a continuous series of places, so that I can obtain the motion by taking together all the places traversed, one there and another there, and so on. But if we merely re-count the individual places, reckoning up together all the individual theres and heres, we do not experience any motion. Only when we see the moving thing in its changing over from there to here do we experience motion, transition. We must not take the places as a pure juxtaposition of there and here. Instead we must take this there as "away from there" and this here as "toward here," hence not simply a there and then again another there, but "away from there" and "toward here." We must see the presented contexture of places, the point manifold, in the horizon of an "away from there—toward here." This is primarily what Aristotle's condition κατὰ to πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον means. The there is not arbitrary; the from-there is prior, antecedent. And the to-here or hither is likewise not an arbitrary here, but for the present, as hither, it is posterior, subsequent. If we thus see the place manifold in the horizon of the "away from there—toward here" and traverse the individual places in this horizon in seeing the motion, the transition, then we retain the first traversed place as the away-from-there and expect the next place as the toward-here. Retaining the prior and expecting the posterior, we see the transition as such. If, thus retentive of the prior and expectant of the posterior, we follow the transition as such, the individual places within the whole transition, which can stretch arbitrarily far, we no longer fix the individual places as individual points or as individual theres and heres arbitrarily paired. In order to grasp and formulate the peculiar retention of the prior and expectation of the posterior to come, we say: now here, formerly there, afterward there. Each there in the nexus of "away from there—toward here" is now-there, now-there, now-there. So far as we see the point manifold in the horizon of the πρότερον and ὕστερον, when following the moving object we say at each time now-here, now-there. Only if we tacitly add this can we read off the time when we look at a watch or clock. We say "now" quite naturally and spontaneously when we look at the timepiece. It is not just a matter of course that we say "now," but in saying it we have already assigned time to the clock. It is not in the clock itself, but in saying "now" we assign it to the clock and the clock gives us the how-many of the nows.22 What is counted when we count as we follow a transition in the horizon of the ἐκ τινος εἰς τι, whether aloud or silently, is the nows. We count a sequence of nows or of thens and at-the-times. The then is the not-yet-now
22. Assignment [Vorgabe] is at bottom the threefold ecstatically horizonal structure of temporality. Temporality [Zeitlichkeit] assigns the now to itself.