﻿ Basic Problems of Phenomenology 253 253
§19. Time and Temporality [357-358]

κινούμενον τὸ δὲ ἠρεμοῦν.40 Time measures the moving and the resting, so far as the one is in motion and the other at rest. Time measures motion at the thing moving: πόση τις,41 how great the transition is, that is, how many nows there are in a particular transition from something to something. Time measures the moving thing οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἔσται μετρητὸν ὑπὸ χρόνου, ᾗ ποσόν τί ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾿ ᾗ ἡ κίνησις αὐτοῦ ποσή;42 it measures it not simply as the moving being that it is; if a stone is in motion, time does not measure the stone as such with respect to its specific extension, but the stone insofar as it is moving. Motion is measured, and only motion is measurable, by time, because time, in virtue of its transitionary character, always already means something in transition, changing or resting. So far as motion or rest can be measured by time, and to be measured by time means "to be in time," the moving or resting thing, and only it, is in time. For this reason we say that geometrical relationships and their contents are extratemporal, because they are not in motion and consequently also are not at rest. A triangle is not at rest because it does not move. It is beyond rest and motion, and therefore, in Aristotle's view, it is neither embraced nor embraceable by time.

The interpretation of intratemporality also tells us what can be intratemporal as well as, on the other hand, what is extratemporal. Thus it becomes ever more clear how time is something counted in connection with motion. Ἅμα γὰρ κινήσεως αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ χρόνου;43 in respect of the moving thing we perceive time together with movement. Where motion is experienced time is unveiled. καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν ᾖ σκότος καὶ μηδὲν διὰ τοῦ σώματος πάσχωμεν, κίνησις δέ τις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐνῇ, εὐθὺς ἅμα δοκεῖ τις γεγονέναι καὶ χρόνος.44 It is not necessary that we should experience motion in things presently at hand. Even when it is dark, when what is at hand is concealed from us but when we are experiencing our own self, our own mental activities, time is also always already given directly together with the experience, εὐθὺς ἅμα. For mental actions also come under the determination of motion—motion taken broadly in the Aristotelian sense and

40. Physica, 5, 221616-18. ["But time will measure what is moved and what is at rest, the one qua moved, the other qua at rest." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

41. Ibid., 221b 19.

42. Ibid., 221b 19f. ["Hence what is moved will not be measurable by the time simply in so far as it has quantity, but in so far as its motion has quantity." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

43. Physica, book 4, 11.219a 3f. [The entire passage to which notes 43-44 refer is the following; "Now we perceive movement and time together, for even when it is dark and we are not being affected through the body, if any movement takes place in the mind we at once suppose that some time also has elapsed; and not only that but also, when some time is thought to have passed, some movement also along with it seems to have taken place. Hence time is either movement or something that belongs to movement. Since then it is not movement, it must be the other." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

44. Ibid., 219a 4-6.