exist? Is it only subjective, or is it only objective, or is it neither the one nor the other? From our earlier discussions we already know that the concepts "subject" and "object" as they are nowadays employed are ontologically indefinite and hence are inadequate, especially for defining the being that we ourselves are, the being that is meant by soul or subject. We point the question about the being of time in the wrong direction from the beginning if we base it on the alternative as to whether time belongs to the subject or object. An unending dialectic can be developed here without saying the least thing about the matter, just as long as it is not settled how the Dasein' s being itself is, whether perhaps it is such that the Dasein, inasmuch as it exists, is further outside than any object and at the same time further inside, more inward (more subjective), than any subject or soul (because temporality as transcendence is openness). We indicated earlier that the phenomenon of the world manifests something of the sort. Given that the Dasein exists, is in a world, everything extant that the Dasein encounters is necessarily intraworldly, held-around [con-tained] by the world. We shall see that in fact the phenomenon of time, taken in a more original sense, is interconnected with the concept of the world and thus with the structure of the Dasein itself. But for the while we must leave untouched the difficulty as Aristotle records it. Time is the before and after insofar as they are counted. As counted it is not antecedently extant in itself. Time does not exist without soul. If time thus becomes dependent on the counting of numbers, it does not follow that it is something mental in the soul. Simultaneously it is ἐν παντί, everywhere, ἐν γῇ, on the earth, ἐν θαλάττῃ, in the ocean, ἐν οὐρανῷ, in the heaven.48 Time is everywhere and yet nowhere and, still, it is only in the soul.
What is essential for understanding the foregoing interpretation of Aristotle's concept of time lies in correctly understanding the concept of ἀκολουθεῖν, to follow. It means an ontological connection of founding which subsists among time, motion, continuity, and dimension. From this concept of founding, of following in the sense of ἀκολουθεῖν, it cannot be inferred that Aristotle identifies time with space. But it surely does become clear that, in bringing time into immediate connection with motion in the sense of local motion, he approaches the mode of measuring time in just the way it is prescribed in the natural understanding of time and in the natural experience of time itself. Of this Aristotle gives only one explicit interpretation. From the mode of interconnection of the now-sequence with motion we saw that the now itself has transitionary character: as now it is always the not-yet-now and the no-longer-now. Due to this transitionary character, it gets the peculiarity of measuring motion as such, as μεταβολή. Since each
48. Physica, 4, 223a 17f.