§19. Time and Temporality [374-375]

γ) Expressed time and its origination in existential
temporality. The ecstatic and horizonal character of temporality

It is only if we keep in view the full structure of the now-sequence in these aspects that we can inquire concretely: Where does that time originate which we know first of all and which we know solely? Can these structural moments of time, and thus tune itself just as at expresses itself, be understood by means of what is expressed in the now, then, and at-the-time, by means of enpresenting, expecting, and retaining? When we are expecting any particular happening, we comport ourselves in our Dasein always in some particular way toward our own most peculiar ability to be. Even if what we are expecting may be some event, some occurrence, still our own Dasein is always conjointly expected in the expecting of the occurrence itself. The Dasein understands itself by way of its own most peculiar capacity to be, of which it is expectant. In thus comporting toward its own most peculiar capacity to be, it is ahead of itself Expecting a possibility, I come from this possibility toward that which I myself am. The Dasein, expecting its ability to be, comes toward itself. In this coming-toward-itself, expectant of a possibility, the Dasein is futural in an original sense. This coming-toward-oneself from one's most peculiar possibility, a coming toward which is implicit in the Dasein's existence and of which all expecting is a specific mode, is the primary concept of the future. This existential concept of the future is the presupposition for the common concept of the future in the sense of the not-yet-now.

Retaining or forgetting something, the Dasein always comports itself somehow toward what it itself already has been. It is only-as it always factically is-in such a way that it has in each instance alTeady been the being that it is. In comporting ourselves toward an entity as bygone, we retain it in a certain way or we forget it. In retaining and forgetting. the Dasein is itself concomitantly retained. It concomitantly retains its own self in what it already has been. That which the Dasein has already been in each instance. its [past as] having-been-ness [Gewesenheit] belongs concomitantly to its future. This having-been-ness, understood primarily, precisely does not mean that the Dasein no longer in fact is: just the contrary, the Dasein is precisely in fact what it was. That which we are as having been has not gone by, passed away, in the sense in which we say that we could shuffle off our past like a garment. The Dasein can as little get rid of its [past as] bygoneness as escape its death. In every sense and in every case everything we have been is an essential determination of our existence. Even if in some way, by some manipulations. I may be able to keep my bygoneness far from myself, nevertheless. forgetting. repressing, suppressing are modes in

Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GA 24) by Martin Heidegger