because the Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is at the same time being-with other Daseins, authentically existent being-with-one-another must also determine itself primarily by way of the individual's resoluteness. Only from and in its resolute individuation is the Dasein authentically free and open for the thou. Being-with-one-another is not a tenacious intrusion of the I upon the thou, derived from their common concealed helplessness; instead, existence as together and with one another is founded on the genuine individuation of the individual, determined by enpresenting in the sense of the instant. Individuation does not mean clinging obstinately to one's own private wishes but being free for the factical possibilities of current existence.
From what has been said one thing should become clear, that the instant belongs to the Dasein's original and authentic temporality and represents the primary and authentic mode of the present as enpresenting. We heard earlier that enpresenting expresses itself in the now, that the now as time in which beings are encountered arises from original temporality. Since the now always arises from the present, this means that the now originates from, comes from, the instant. It is for this reason that the phenomenon of the instant cannot be understood from the now, as Kierkegaard tries to do. To be sure, he understands the instant quite well in its real contents, but he does not succeed in expounding the specific temporality of the instant. Instead, he identifies the instant with the now of time in the common sense. Starting from here he constructs the paradoxical relationships of the now to eternity. But the phenomenon of the instant cannot be understood from the now even if we take the now in its full structure. The only thing that can be shown is that the now most expeditiously manifests its full structure precisely where the Dasein as resolute enpresenting expresses itself by means of the now. The instant is a primal phenomenon of original temporality, whereas the now is merely a phenomenon of derivative time. Aristotle already saw the phenomenon of the instant, the kairos, and he defined it in the sixth book of his Nichomachean Ethics; but, again, he did it in such a way that he failed to bring the specific time character of the kairos into connection with what he otherwise knows as time (nun).
The present pertinent to the Dasein's temporality does not constantly have the character of the instant. The Dasein does not constantly exist as resolute but is usually irresolute, closed off to itself in its own most peculiar ability to be, and not determined primarily from its most peculiar ability to be in the way it projects its possibilities. The Dasein's temporality does not constantly temporalize itself from that temporality's authentic future. Nevertheless, this inconstancy of existence, its being generally irresolute, does not mean that in its existence the irresolute Dasein at times lacks a future. It only means that temporality itself, with respect to its different ecstases,