especially the future, is changeable. Irresolute existence is so little a nonexistence that it is precisely this irresoluteness which characterizes the everyday actuality of the Dasein.
Because we are trying to expound existent comportment in the everyday sense toward the beings most proximately given, we must turn our view upon everyday, inauthentic, irresolute existence and ask what the character is of the temporality of inauthentic self-understanding, of the Dasein' s irresolute projection of itself upon possibilities. We know that the Dasein is being-in-the-world; factically existing as such, it is being-among intraworldly beings and being-with-other Daseins. The Dasein understands itself at first and usually from things. The others, the fell ow humans, are also there with the Dasein even when they are not to be found there in immediately tangible proximity. In the way they are there with the Dasein they are also jointly understood with it via things. Let us recall Rilke's description in which he shows how the inhabitants of the demolished house, those fellow humans, are encountered with its wall. The fellow humans with whom we have to do daily are also there, even without any explicit existentiell relation of one Dasein to others. Keeping all of this in mind, we may now turn our exploratory regard solely to understanding comportment toward things handy and things extant.
We understand ourselves by way of things, in the sense of the selfunderstanding of everyday Dasein. To understand ourselves from the things with which we are occupied means to project our own ability to be upon such features of the business of our everyday occupation as the feasible, urgent, indispensable, expedient. The Dasein understands itself from the ability to be that is determined by the success and failure, the feasibility and unfeasibility, of its commerce with things. The Dasein thus comes toward itself from out of the things. It expects its own can-be as the can-be of a being which relies on what things give or what they refuse. It is as though the Dasein's can-be were projected by the things, by the Dasein's commerce with them, and not primarily by the Dasein itself from its own most peculiar self, which nevertheless exists, just as it is, always as dealing with things. This inauthentic self-understanding by way of things has, indeed, the character of coming-toward-itself, of the future, but this is inauthentic future; we characterize it as expecting [Gewärtigen]. Only because the Dasein is expectant of its can-be in the sense described, as coming from the things it attends to and cares for-only because of this expecting can it anticipate, await something from the things or wait for the way they run off. Expecting must already beforehand have unveiled a sphere from which something can be awaited. Expecting is thus not a subspecies of waiting for or anticipating but just the reverse: waiting for, anticipating, is grounded in an expecting, a looking-forward-to. When in our commerce with things we