only on the basis of the future, because this structural moment of time is intrinsically ecstatic. The ecstatic character of time makes possible the Dasein's specific overstepping character, transcendence, and thus also the world. Then-and with this we come to the most central determination of the world and of temporality-the ecstases of temporality (future, past, and present) are not simply removals to ... , not removals as it were to the nothing. Rather, as removals to ... and thus because of the ecstatic character of each of them, they each have a horizon which is prescribed by the mode of the removal, the carrying-away, the mode of the future, past, and present, and which belongs to the ecstasis itself. Each ecstasis, as removal to ... , has at the same time within itself and belonging to it a predelineation of the formal structure of the whereto of the removal. We call this whither of the ecstasis the horizon or, more precisely, the horizonal schema of the ecstasis. Each ecstasis has within itself a completely determinate schema which modifies itself in coordination with the manner in which temporality temporalizes itself, the manner in which the ecstases modify themselves. just as the ecstases intrinsically constitute the unity of temporality, so in each case there corresponds to the ecstatic unity of temporality such a unity of its horizonal schemata. The transcendence of being-in-the-world is founded in its specific wholeness on the original ecstatic-horizonal unity of temporality. If transcendence makes possible the understanding of being and if transcendence is founded on the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of temporality, then temporality is the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being.
The task now is to comprehend how, on the basis of the temporality that grounds the Dasein's transcendence, the Dasein's Temporality makes possible the understanding of being. The most original temporalizing of temporality as such is Temporality. In connection with it we have always already oriented our considerations toward the question of the possibility of a specific understanding of being, namely, the understanding of being in the sense of extantness in its broadest signification. We have shown further how commerce with beings is grounded, as commerce, in temporality. But from this we have only partly inferred that this commerce is also understanding of being and is possible, precisely as such, on the basis of temporality. It must now be shown explicitly how the understanding of the handiness of handy equipment is as such a world-understanding, and how this world-understanding, as the Dasein's transcendence, is rooted in the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of the Dasein's temporality. Understanding of the handiness of