§21. Temporality and Being [436-437]

time qua intratemporality cannot therefore take over the Temporal interpretation of the being of beings, here of handiness. In all now-determination, in all common time-determination of the handy, if indeed the handy is already understood, time is employed in a more original sense. This means that the common characterization of the being of beings in regard to time—temporal, timeless, supratemporal—is untenable for us. It is not an ontological but an ontical interpretation, in which time itself is taken as a being.

Praesens is a more original phenomenon than the now. The instant is more original than the now for the reason that the instant is a mode of the pre-sent, of the enpresenting of something, which can express itself with the saying of "now." We thus come back again to the present and the question arises anew, Is praesens after all identical with present? In no way. We distinguished the present, the enpresenting of . .. , as one of the ecstases of temporality. The name "praesens" itself already indicates that we do not mean by it an ecstatic phenomenon as we do with present and future, at any rate not the ecstatic phenomenon of temporality with regard to its ecstatic structure. Nevertheless, there exists a connection between present and praesens which is not accidental. We have pointed to the fact that the ecstases of temporality are not simply removals to ... , in which the direction of the removal goes as it were to the nothing or is as yet indeterminate. Instead, each ecstasis as such has a horizon that is determined by it and that first of all completes that ecstasis' own structure. Enpresenting, whether authentic in the sense of the instant or inauthentic, projects that which it enpresents, that which can possibly confront us in and for a present, upon something like praesens. The ecstasis of the present is as such the condition of possibility of a specific "beyond itself," of transcendence, the projection upon praesens. As the condition of possibility of the "beyond itself," the ecstasis of the present has within itself a schematic pre-designation of the where out there this "beyond itself" is. That which lies beyond the ecstasis as such, due to the character of removal and as determined by that character, or, more precisely, that which determines the whither of the "beyond itself" as such in general, is praesens as horizon. The present projects itself within itself ecstatically upon praesens. Praesens is not identical with present, but, as basic determination of the horizonal schema of this ecstasis, it joins in constituting the complete time-structure of the present. Corresponding remarks apply to the other two ecstases, future and past (repetition, forgetting, retaining).

In order not to confuse unduly our vision of the phenomena of temporality, which moreover are themselves so hard to grasp, we shall restrict ourselves to the explication of the present and its ecstatic horizon, praesens. Enpresenting is the ecstasis in the temporalizing of temporality which understands itself as such upon praesens. As removal to ..., the present is a