the disturbed quality of the commerce, and indeed a disturbance that proceeds from the being itself with which we are dealing.
Equipmental contexture has the characteristic that the individual pieces of equipment are correlated among themselves with each other, not only in general with reference to the inherent character of each but also in such a way that each piece of equipment has the place belonging to it. The place of a piece of equipment within an equipmental contexture is always determined with regard to the handy quality of the handy thing prescribed and required by the functionality totality. If a habitual procedure gets interrupted by that with which it is occupied, then the activity halts, and in fact in such a way that the procedure does not simply break off but, as held up, merely dwells explicitly upon that with which it has to do. The most severe case in which a habitual occupation of any sort can be interrupted and brought to a halt occurs when some equipment pertinent to the equipmental contexture is missing. Being missing means the unavailability of something otherwise handy, its un-handiness. The question is, How can something missing fall upon our attention? How can we become aware of something unavailable? How is the uncovering of a missing thing possible? Is there any sort of access to the unavailable and non-handy? Is there a mode of exhibition of what is not handy? Obviously, for we also say "I see some that are not here." What is the mode of access to the unavailable? The peculiar way in which the unavailable is uncovered in a specific mode is missing it. How is this kind of comportment ontologically possible? What is the temporality of missing something? Taken formally, missing is the counter-comportment to finding. The finding of something, however, is a species of enpresenting something, and consequently not-finding is a not-enpresenting. Is missing then a not-enpresenting, a not-letting something be encountered, an absence and omission of an enpresenting? Is that how the matter really stands? Can missing be a not-letting-encounter, although we have already said that it is the access to the unavailable as such? Missing is so little a not-enpresenting that its nature lies precisely in a specific mode of enpresenting. Missing is not a not-finding of something. If we do not meet with something, this notmeeting doesn't always have to be a missing it. This is expressed by the circumstance that in such cases we can subsequently say "The thing not met with-I can also miss it." Missing is the not-finding of something we have been expecting as needed. In reference to our dealing with equipment this is the same as saying: what we need in use of the equipment itself. Only in a circumspective letting-function, in which we understand the encountered entity by way of its functionality, its in-order-to relations-in which we expect a for-what and enpresent what is useful in bringing it about-only there can we find that something is missing. Missing is a not-enpresenting, not in the sense of a remaining away of the present, but rather an un-enpresenting