§21. Temporality and Being [444-446]

the question about the possible understanding of being in general. Consequently, in the first part of our critical discussion of the basic ontological problems we pointed positively to the way the trend of inquiry aims at the "subject," how it unconsciously demands a preparatory ontological interpretation of the Dasein.

b) The Kantian interpretation of being and the problematic of Temporality [Temporalität]

Following this exposition of the being of the extant in general in the broadest sense with regard to praesens, we may now return briefly to the Kantian thesis and our critique of it, so as to give this critique a more original foundation by the results achieved in the meantime. There will thus emerge an explicit confrontation between the Kantian interpretation of being and the Temporal problematic which has been developed. Kant's thesis asserts something negative and something positive. Negatively, being is not a real predicate; positively, being equals position, existence {extantness) equals absolute position. Our criticism had to do with the positive content of the thesis. We did not criticize it by opposing to it a so-called different standpoint from which then to play off objections to it. Our aim in reverse was to go along with his thesis and his attempt at the interpretation of being and to inquire, in this attendant examination, what further clarification the thesis, its content, in itself requires if it is to remain tenable as substantiated by the phenomenon itself. Being is position; extantness or, as Kant says, existence [DaseinJ is absolute position or perception. We first ran into a characteristic ambiguity in the expression "perception," according to which it means perceiving, perceived, and perceivedness. This ambiguity is not accidental but gives expression to a phenomenal fact. What we call perception has an intrinsic structure that is so multiform-uniform that it makes possible this ambiguity of designation in different respects. What is designated by perception is a phenomenon whose structure is determined by intentionality. Intentionality, self-relation to something, seemed at first sight to be something trivial. However, the phenomenon proved to be puzzling as soon as we recognized clearly that a correct understanding of this structure has to be on its guard against two common errors which are not yet overcome even in phenomenology (erroneous objectivizing, erroneous subjectivizing). Intentionality is not an extant relation between an extant subject and an extant object but is constitutive for the relational character of the subject's comportment as such. As the structure of subjectcomportment, it is not something immanent to the subject which would then need supplementation by a transcendence; instead, transcendence, and

Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GA 24) by Martin Heidegger