§9. Truth and the essence of man [24-25] 23

openness of the things, of the region between things and man, of man himself, and of man to fellow man. If it were not for this openness, there could never occur a representing that conforms to a thing. For this conforming to ... does not first create the openness of the things and the openness of man for what he might encounter. On the contrary, it settles into an openness already holding sway and does so, as it were, each time anew. This openness is therefore the ground of the possibility of correctness and as this ground it is something worthy of questioning and inquiry. At first it is unclear what it really is that we are referring to here and are calling openness. And that could only be one more reason to abandon the inquiry into what we say is worthy of questioning, especially if we recall that for two thousand years Western history has been satisfied with the ordinary conception of truth.



c) The question of truth as the most questionable of our previous history and the most worthy of questioning of our future history.


At this hour in the history of the world we can and must ask where the Occident has finally arrived with its conception of truth. Where do we stand today? What and where is truth? In spite of everything correct, have we lost the truth? Has the West not fallen into a situation where all goals are dubious and where all bustle and bother merely aim at finding a means of escape? How else are we supposed to understand metaphysically that Western man is driven either to the complete destruction of what has been handed down or to warding off this destruction?

These means of escape are not decisions. Extreme decisions require the positing of goals that transcend all usefulness and every purpose and therefore are alone powerful enough to instigate a new creating and founding. Decisions, as such positing of goals, especially in the situation we sketched, need the grounding of the soil and the installation of the perspective with regard to which and in which they are supposed to be made.

Are we—and for that decision this is most decisive—are we willfully and knowingly only at what lies closest, i.e., at the preparation for this decision?


Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic” (GA 45) by Martin Heidegger