With the return to that openness by which all correctness first becomes possible, we in fact presuppose that the determination of truth as correctness has indeed its own legitimacy. Is this then already proved? The characterization of truth as correctness could very well be an error. At any rate, up to now it has not been shown that this characterization is not an error. But if the conception of truth as correctness is an error, what then about the positing of the ground of the possibility of correctness? To say the least, such a positing can in that case not claim to grasp the essence of truth more fundamentally. On the contrary, we must concede that what supports an error and founds it is a fortiori erroneous.
What is the meaning of the return to the manifold-unitary openness if it is not proven in advance that what we take to be the point of departure for the return, namely the ordinary determination of truth as correctness, has its own justification?
Now, in fact, the conception of truth as correctness is confirmed through a long tradition. But the appeal to tradition is not yet a foundation and safeguard of the truth of an intuition. For centuries, the tradition clung to the opinion that the sun revolves around the earth, and the eyes themselves even confirmed it. Nevertheless, this opinion could be shaken. Perhaps the traditional character of an insight is even an objection against its correctness. Is it not possible that what might in itself be an error can become a “truth” by being believed long enough? Whatever may be the case here, the mere long duration and venerable character of a tradition are not, by themselves, a reliable ground to prove the truth of an essential determination.
But must we appeal to traditional opinions in order to ascertain the legitimacy of the determination of truth as correctness? After all, we can form for ourselves a judgment about this legitimacy. And that is not difficult, for the characterization of truth as the correspondence of a representation with an object is self-evident. This obviousness has the advantage that it is relieved from further foundation. What we call the obvious is what is clearly evident on its own, without further thought. Now, to be sure, it has been shown conclusively enough that if we take truth as correctness of representation, we in fact avoid further thought and that here something is evident for us because we are renouncing every attempt to elucidate it more closely and more