§13. The traditional conception of truth [39-40] 37

it as something traditional. The appeal to what has been handed down, the so-called “tradition,” is not a foundation. Not even if the traditional has become obvious. Obviousness is always a very problematic assurance of the legitimacy of an intuition. For, on the one hand, it is questionable to what extent that which is supposed to be obvious to the understanding is really understood or whether we have here precisely a renunciation of the will to understand and the appeal to thoughtlessness elevated to a principle. On the other hand, it could be asked what kind of intelligibility or understanding is providing the standard here. What might be very obvious on a certain level of understanding—the most superficial—can be wholly unintelligible on the plane of the will to genuine comprehension.

If, consequently, the customary determination of truth as correctness appears to us correct precisely when we reflect no further on it, then this “obviousness” is not yet a sufficient foundation for the delimitation of the essence of the true.



3) Toward the foundation of the customary conception of truth through a historical reflection on its origin. The distinction between a historiographical consideration and a historical reflection.


Therefore, in order to gain the foundation of the customary conception of truth, we will question back and examine how it was founded when it was first put forth. Thus we are forced to turn to the philosophy of Aristotle. That means that instead of actually asking the question of truth by ourselves and for ourselves, i.e., for the future, we will lose ourselves in historiographical considerations and reports about the ancient past.

What is happening here? Are we really acting contrary to our own intentions by returning to history? No. But we can only understand that a reflection on history belongs precisely and essentially to the will to shape the future if we distinguish between a historiographical consideration and a historical reflection.

The historiographical, as the word itself is supposed to indicate, refers to the past insofar as it is explored and presented, either expressly or inexpressly, from the perspective of what happens to be the present. Every historiographical consideration


Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic” (GA 45) by Martin Heidegger