containing the foundation have been lost. For it is certainly not possible to assume a thinker of Aristotle’s rank would simply proclaim arbitrarily and without foundation such a decisive determination as that of the essence of truth. And yet no reference is ever made to such treatises in which the foundation would be supplied. Quite to the contrary, the foundation we are seeking should be discovered, if anywhere, precisely where Aristotle deals with truth as a property of the assertion (Met. Ε 4, Met. Θ 10, De anima Γ, De interpretatione), and it is exactly there that we look in vain.
Yet we will be able to think through and appreciate the full import of the fact that there is no genuine foundation given to this positing of the essence of truth as the correctness of an assertion only if we realize that since in general the traditional conception of truth is not founded, the state of everything true that we seek, find, and establish in the light of this essential determination must be very remarkable. All this is true and correct—on the basis of an unfounded opinion about truth: true on a basis which is not a basis at all and which will one day come to light in its groundlessness, even if only very slowly and only visible for very few.
But before we decide to draw such a conclusion, we must once more critically examine the question at stake here. The positing of the essence of truth as the correctness of an assertion is obviously only one essential determination among others. For Plato’s philosophy, and Aristotle’s, also determine the essence of the soul, motion, place, time, friendship, justice, the state, man, etc. What is at issue in each case is, Platonically speaking, the determination of “ideas,” and in each case a genuine foundation is lacking. Perhaps under the title “foundation” we are seeking something which may not be sought and demanded regarding an essential determination. Then would what is essential in the knowledge of and comportment toward beings, the view in advance of the “idea,” the determination of the essence, be groundless and arbitrary?
So it is now time to ask precisely how we are to understand “founding.” To found an assertion means to indicate its ground, to exhibit the basis of its legitimacy, of its correctness. Consequently, to found in the genuine sense is to exhibit and show that about which the assertion says something. This must be the standard to measure whether what is said is appropriate to the thing