Now if all grasping and positing of the essence exclude the possibility of being founded—not because the foundation cannot be discovered, but because founding as such is not sufficient for the legitimation of the positing of an essence—if the grasping of the essence rejects every attempt at a foundation in the sense we discussed, then the truth which belongs to the grasping of the essence and which is stamped on it cannot be correctness. Therefore another kind of truth must belong to the grasping of the essence. Thus a reflection on the truth of essence, on what a grasping of essence is, and what its justification is, becomes a reflection on the essence of truth.
The grasping of the essence is a bringing-forth: specifically, in the Greek sense of a bringing out and fetching forth. Whence? From concealment. Whither? Into unconcealedness, in order to posit it as the unconcealed. To see the essence in productive seeing means to posit the unconcealed of beings, to posit beings in their unconcealedness, to take them up into the naming word, and in that way establish them and thereby let them stand in the visibility of an essential cognition.
The unconcealed is in Greek τὸ ἀληθές, and unconcealedness is ἀλήθεια. For ages, this has been translated as veritas, “truth” [Wahrheit]. The “truth” of the grasping of the essence is, thought in the Greek manner, the unconcealedness of the whatness of beings. Unconcealedness, the being-seen of beings is, in Platonic terms, ἰδέα.
A being in its beingness (οὐσία) is, briefly and properly, the unconcealedness of the being itself. Beings, determined with regard to their unconcealedness, are thereby grasped with respect to their coming forth and emerging, their φύσις, i.e., as ἰδέα, and so are grasped as nothing other than beings in their beingness. To productively see a being as such in its beingness—in what it is as a being—means nothing else than to encounter it simply in its unconcealedness, and, as Aristotle (Met. Θ 10) says, θιγεῖν, to feel it, simply touch upon it and in touching it to push it forward, to bring it before oneself, to produce and see its look. Since, in the Greek experience, beings as such are φύσις, emergence, there belongs to beings as such ἀλήθεια, unconcealedness. Therefore the grasping of beings as such must be a disclosing (a taking out from concealment). We cannot now articulate