more precisely what all this signifies in a more profound sense and in every one of its consequences, namely that for the Greeks the truth is a—indeed, the—character of beings as such. We will only note that the grasping of the essence claims a special kind of "truth": unconcealedness.
As we have heard often enough, all cognition and knowledge of individual beings is grounded in an acquaintance with the essence. Knowledge as the representation of individual beings is founded to the extent that it is correct. Now, however, if the knowledge of individual beings, the true representing of facts, is grounded in a knowledge of the essence, then the truth of factual knowledge, i.e., correctness, for its part must also be grounded in the truth of the knowledge of the essence. Truth as correctness (ὁμοίωσις) has its ground in truth as unconcealedness (ἀλήθεια), the coming-forth, and being in view in advance, of the beingness (essence) of beings. What is seen in a productive seeing and claimed as the ground of the positing of truth as correctness is truth as ἀλήθεια. Ἀλήθεια (the unconcealedness of beings as such) is now the original and genuinely Greek name for truth, because it names the more original essence of truth. Neither the Latin word Veritas nor our German word Wahrheit ["truth"] contain the least echo of what the Greeks saw in advance and experienced when they spoke about truth in their sense: ἀλήθεια.
Where do we now stand? We asked how the ordinary definition of truth, of the essence of the true—namely, the correctness of an assertion—was founded originally in Aristotle. We showed that because the positing of correctness as the essence of truth accomplishes an essential positing, there can be no question of a foundation, which is the reason we seek in vain for one. Nevertheless, the positing of the essence is not arbitrary but is the positing of a ground, the taking up of that which makes possible what is to be grasped in its essence and gives it its ground.