What then provides the ground for truth conceived as correctness? The ground of correctness (ὁμοίωσις) is ἀλήθεια, the unconcealedness of beings. What does ἀ-λήθεια, the unconcealedness of beings, mean? Nothing else but that beings as such are not concealed and not closed, and hence are open. The openness of beings proves to be the ground of the possibility of correctness. And that is exactly what we brought out at the beginning of our inquiry. We showed that the openness of beings lies at the ground of the ordinary conception of truth as correctness, and we saw the need to question this openness as such in order to grasp the essence of truth originally. We contended that this openness is what is properly worthy of questioning in the question of truth. And we saw that the Greeks already knew this openness of beings; indeed, they took ἀλήθεια, the unconcealedness of beings, as the proper essence of truth. Furthermore, for the Greeks the true is in advance the unconcealed, and truth is the same as the unconcealedness of beings. Only because of such a productive seeing of truth on the part of the Greeks could the possibility of the assimilation to beings of a proposition or representation not be a question for them and not at all be in need of a foundation; on the contrary, with regard to ἀλήθεια such an assimilation presents itself as self-evident. Were the Greeks thus aware that the correctness of an assertion requires the openness of beings as its essential ground? If so, our referring to what is worthy of questioning in the ordinary conception of truth is wholly superfluous and exceedingly belated. There is no longer anything to ask here because the Greeks have already answered the question of truth.
Thus if we today want to rise above the ordinary conception of truth as correctness, and if we must do so to grasp it in its proper essence and ground, and in that way answer the question of truth sufficiently, then there is obviously no need at all for toil on our part; we simply have to return to what Greek philosophy has already seen. At most, we would need to recall something forgotten. Nor is this forgetting itself very remarkable, because from the time of Aristotle, or even since Plato, the conception of truth as the correctness of an assertion has been the standard, and the only standard, for the determination of the essence of truth, and the name ἀλήθεια was then employed spontaneously to express the correctness of an assertion, i.e., to