the West, Nietzsche, for both of them the same conception of truth, as a characteristic of judging reason, was authoritative. And this did not at all occur on the basis of an explicit reflection but entirely as if it were all beyond question—where indeed it still stands today.
The result of everything here is that our critical reflection is superfluous, because it has already been accomplished. Furthermore, this accomplishment has long since been overcome. Therefore our presumably more original question into the essence of truth is without necessity. In fact, everything comes down to this: Does our inquiry arise merely from an unfounded resistance against the past, hence in the end from a blind and simple desire for novelty—or from a necessity? And if so, from which one?
At this point we see at once that it is not possible in philosophy—as it is in science—for a critical question to demonstrate itself on the basis of an objective state of affairs. The philosophical question must bear its necessity within itself; it must—if sufficiently unfolded—make this necessity itself visible. Therefore, if now, after this first substantive clarification of the domain of the inquiry, we reflect on the necessity of the question, we are not thereby abandoning the question of truth, and are not leaving it behind, but are performing the very first step leading to its unfolding.