that in them a determinate individual object stands out as being unusual and distinguishes itself with regard to an equally determinate sphere of what is experienced precisely as usual. The unusual, as other, is in each case opposed to the usual, and all amazement, admiration, and awe are a turning away from the usual, thereby leaving it alone and bypassing it in its usualness. Now what about wonder?
a) In wonder what is most usual itself becomes the most unusual.
The usual and the most usual—precisely the most usual whose usualness goes so far that it is not even known or noticed in its usualness — this most usual itself becomes in wonder what is most unusual.
b) In wonder what is most usual of all and in all, in whatever manner this might be, becomes the most unusual.
The most usual, which arises in wonder as the unusual, is not this or that, something particular that has shown itself as objective and determinate in some specific activity or individual consideration. In wonder, what is most usual of all and in all, i.e., everything, becomes the most unusual. Everything has in everything at first the most usual to which attention is not paid and which, if it is glimpsed, is not explicitly heeded. Everything bears in everything the most usual, for this exists everywhere, altogether, and in every way. Everything in what is most usual (beings) becomes in wonder the most unusual in this one respect: that it is what it is. This implies:
c) The most extreme wonder knows no way out of the unusualness of what is most usual.
For the most extreme wonder, anything whatsoever as such and everything as everything become the most unusual. Thus this wonder no longer adheres to this or that, from which it could still explain the unusualness of the usual and thereby could dispel its unusualness and turn it into something ordinary. But by