times assumes the role of denoting knowledge pure and simple, and that means the perceptual relation to beings as such. Now it is clear that this perceiving of beings in their unconcealedness is not a mere gaping, that wonder is carried out rather in a procedure against beings, but in such a way that these themselves precisely show themselves. For that is what τέχνη means: to grasp beings as emerging out of themselves in the way they show themselves, in their outward look, εἶδος, ἰδέα, and, in accord with this, to care for beings themselves and to let them grow, i.e., to order oneself within beings as a whole through productions and institutions. Τέχνη is a mode of proceeding against φύσις, though not yet in order to overpower it or exploit it, and above all not in order to turn use and calculation into principles, but, on the contrary, to retain the holding sway of φύσις in unconcealedness. Therefore, because the pure acknowledgment of beings as such, the perception of φύσις in its ἀλήθεια, is the disposing need in the basic disposition of wonder, τέχνη and its carrying out become necessary as what is wholly other than φύσις—wholly other yet belonging φύσις in the most essential way.
This basic attitude) toward φύσις, τέχνη, as the carrying out of the necessity and need of wonder, is at the same time, however, the ground upon which arises ὁμοίωσις, the transformation of ἀλήθεια as unconcealedness in correctness. In other words, in carrying out the basic disposition itself there resides the danger of its disturbance and destruction. For in the essence of τέχνη, as required by φύσις itself, as the occurrence and establishment of the unconcealedness of beings, there lies the possibility of arbitrariness, of an unbridled positing of goals and thereby the possibility of escape out of the necessity of the primordial need.
If this happens, then in place of the basic disposition of wonder, the avidity for learning and calculation enters in . Philosophy itself then becomes one institution among others, it becomes