ADDENDUM
On pages 189 and 197 an essential difficulty will force itself on the attentive reader: it looks as if the remarks about the "fixing in place of truth" and the "letting happen of the advent of truth" could never be brought into accord. For "fixing in place" implies a willing that blocks and thus prevents the advent of truth. In letting-happen on the other hand, there is manifested a compliance and thus, as it were, a nonwilling, that clears the way for the advent of truth.
The difficulty is resolved if we understand fixing in place in the sense intended throughout the entire text of the essay, above all in the key specification "setting-into-work." Also correlated with "to place" and "to set" is "to lay"; all three meanings are still intended jointly by the Latin ponere.
We must think "to place" in the sense of θέσις. Thus on page 186 the statement is made, "Setting and taking possession are here everywhere (I) thought on the basis of the Greek sense of θέσις, which means a setting up in the unconcealed." The Greek "setting" means placing, as for instance, letting a statue be set up. It means laying, laying down an oblation. Placing and laying have the sense of bringing here into the unconcealed, bringing forth into what is present, that is, letting lie forth. Setting and placing here never mean the modern concept of commandeering things to be placed over against the self (the ego-subject). The standing of the statue {GA 5: 71} (i.e., the presencing of the radiance facing us) is different from the standing of what stands over against us in the sense of the object. "Standing" (See p. 162) is constancy of shining. By contrast, thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis in the dialectic of Kant and German Idealism mean a placing or putting within the sphere of subjectivity of consciousness. Accordingly, Hegel—correctly in terms of his position