218
BASIC WRITINGS

toward beings. Thinking, in contrast, lets itself be claimed by Being so that it can say the truth of Being. Thinking accomplishes this letting. Thinking is l'engagement par l'Etre pour l'Etre [engagement by Being for Being]. I do not know whether it is linguistically possible to say both of these ("par" and "pour") at once, in this way: penser, c'est l'engagement de l'Etre [thinking is the engagement of Being]. Here the possessive form "de l' . . ." is supposed to express both subjective and objective genitives. In this regard "subject" and "object" are inappropriate terms of metaphysics, which very early on in the form of Occidental "logic" and "grammar" seized control of the interpretation of language. We today can only begin to descry what is concealed in that occurrence. The liberation of language from grammar into a more original essential framework is reserved for thought and poetic creation. Thinking is not merely l'engagement dans l'action for and by beings, in the sense of the actuality of the present situation. Thinking is l'engagement by and for the truth of Being. The history of Being is never past but stands ever before; it sustains and defines every condition et situation humaine. In order to learn how to experience the aforementioned essence of thinking purely, and that means at the same time to carry it through, we must free ourselves from the technical interpretation of thinking. The beginnings of that interpretation reach back to Plato and Aristotle. They take thinking itself to be a technē, a process of reflection in service to doing and making. But here reflection is already seen from the perspective of praxis and poiēsis. For this reason thinking, when taken for itself, is not "practical." The characterization of thinking as theōria and the determination of knowing as "theoretical" behavior occur already within the "technical" interpretation of thinking. Such characterization is a reactive attempt to rescue thinking and preserve its autonomy over against acting and doing. Since then "philosophy" has been in the constant predicament of having to justify its existence before the "sciences." It believes it can do that most effectively by elevating itself to the rank of a science. But such an effort is the