of Western philosophy and also justified in finding these objections self-evident. Indeed, we even believe we are attempting to be especially critical and serious when we strive to make such objections heard.1 |
d) The distance from the beginning of Western philosophy
Assuming, however, it could actually and convincingly be declared that our purported relation to history is merely a prejudice and that consequently we lack any intrinsic claim to be competent to put forth these objections, indeed, that they have been put forth only from not understanding history and from a negative relation [ein Un-verhältnis] to it—assuming all this, then would the objections not have to collapse, whereby refutation of them becomes superfluous? Certainly; but what would then be gained? We would not have eliminated the objections by way of a refutation but, instead, would have disabled them in advance through a withdrawal of their ground.
Yet will the temporal distance of two and a half millennia that separates us from the beginning become less thereby? Will the beginning become less antiquated thereby? Through the dismissal of the objections do we attain the positive result that the beginning is of some immediate concern to us? Can such reflections, no matter how subtle, simply conjure up an actual relation to history and to the beginning? Two and a half millennia—the myriad changes in the world and in humanity indeed cannot be undone by such reflections, quite apart from the circumstance that we still do not see to what end that should happen. Are not beginnings rather in each case there precisely so that after them everything moves away from them?
We remain shut off from the “beginning,” whether or not we refute the cited objections, whether or not we wonder about the presuppositions on which they are based, whether or not we simply disregard them. No artifices of interpretation can transport us over this gap of millennia, no so-called empathy can magically replace something bygone with something real.—That is how matters stand, if we stay sober and do not fool ourselves. We must face the fact of our continuous movement away from the beginning. More precisely, we must face the fact of our detachment from the beginning. And is it not a splendid thing to bow soberly to the facts, especially when they are as indisputable
1. But what if the converse?—Historiology in history and historiology allowing us in, but just as much slackening, undermining, destroying, and thereby still deluding. If then this prejudice nevertheless holds sway, the consequence is a disempowering and a negative relation to history. Out of this, the objections against a relation to history!!