§19 [111-112]
ground as paved thoroughfare. But “way” also in the sense of the panorama and the outlook the road offers, i.e., the region through which the road leads. Every way has its prospect. And that is what is at issue here. ὁδὸς πολύθημος (1, 2)—much-heralding; not, as Diels takes it, the famous way, the much-heralded way. For who is supposed to herald it, since it is now first disclosed and the many do precisely not know of it? On the contrary, the way is much-heralding; it offers many a prospect, it opens access to. . . . To what? If it is the way of ἀλήθεια, then obviously to the unconcealed as such.
This way is accordingly distinguished at 1, 27: ἦ γὰρ ἀπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτοῦ ἐστίν. πάτος, the trodden path, constantly traversed by everyone; apart from this. What counts is not to follow in the tracks and steps of the crowd; apart from their opinions and fancies, not to be determined by what they say and hear and believe.
It is a matter of ways: more precisely, it is a matter of taking them, keeping to the ways taken, in order to be underway on them, to pursue the way and its essence, to go after—μετά—μέθοδος—method. |
b) The disclosure of method
The essence and necessity of method are disclosed. Method is not a prerogative of science; on the contrary, science can and must be methodical only insofar as it is rooted in philosophy.
We are standing in the middle of a basic meditation on method; to be sure, not method as formal, detachable technique. Then what? The way Parmenides is supposed to take under the guidance of Ἀλήθεια is apart from the common path of humans. And yet not something peculiar in the sense of the practices of a secret doctrine, the techniques of some mystery rite; on the contrary, the way places us for the first time in the open realm—taken in its full meaning. The prospect decisive! The goddess (Ἀλήθεια) says at 1, 28: χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι—you must experience everything, πάντα. How everything? 1, 29: ἠμέν—ἠδέ: both unconcealedness as well as human views, which are thus distinguished from truth as some sort of untruth.
Yet did we not precisely hear that the way of the goddess would be far remote from the path tread by humans? Now, however, Parmenides is indeed supposed to experience these views and so must travel this path too. No; he is not supposed to frequent the path tread by humans and become acquainted with their views, δόξαι; instead, Parmenides is to experience on this path, i.e., come to understand, what this path as such is all about. He is not supposed to hear opinions and thereby half-truths and half-falsehoods but, instead, is to gain insight into the essence of the view of δόξα, thus gain the truth about δόξα. And correspondingly: