With this kind of approach one remains blind to what is already tacitly implied even when one takes the phenomenon of knowing as one's theme in the most provisional manner: namely, that knowing is a mode of Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, and is founded ontically upon this state of Being. But if, as we suggest, we thus find phenomenally that knowing is a kind of Being which belongs to Being-in-the-world, one might object that with such an Interpretation of knowing, the problem of knowledge is nullified; for what is left to be asked if one presupposes that knowing is already 'alongside' its world, when it is not supposed to reach that world except in the transcending of the subject ? In this question the constructivist 'standpoint', which has not been phenomenally demonstrated, again comes to the fore; but quite apart from this, what higher court is to decide whether and in what sense there is to be any problem of knowledge other than that of the phenomenon of knowing as such and the kind of Being which belongs to the knower?
If we now ask what shows itself in the phenomenal findings about knowing, we must keep in mind that knowing is grounded beforehand in a Being-already-alongside-the-world, which is essentially constitutive for Dasein's Being.1 Proximally, this Being-already-alongside is not just a fixed staring at something that is purely present-at-hand. Being-in-the-world, as concern, is fascinated by the world with which it is concerned.2 If knowing is to be possible as a way of determining the nature of the present-at-hand by observing it,3 then there must first be a deficiency in our having-to-do with the world concernfully. When concern holds back [Sichenthalten] from any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like, it puts itself into what is now the sole remaining mode of Being-in, the mode of just tarrying alongside. ... [das Nur-noch-verweilen bei ...] This kind of Being towards the world is one which lets us encounter entities within-the-world purely in the way they look (εἶδος), just that; on the basis of this kind of Being, and as a mode of it, looking explicitly at what we encounter is possible.4 Looking at something in this way is sometimes a definite way of taking up a direction towards something—of setting our sights towards what is present-at-hand. It takes over a 'view-point' in advance from the entity which it encounters. Such looking-at enters the mode of dwelling autonomously alongside entities within-the-world.5
1 '... dass das Erkennen selbst vorgängig gründet in einem Schon-sein-bei-der-Welt, als welches das Sein von Dasein wesenhaft konstituiert.'
2 'Das In-der-Welt-sein ist als Besorgen von der besorgten Welt benommen.' Here we follow the older editions. The newer editions have 'das Besorgen' instead of 'als Besorgen'.
3 'Damit Erkennen als betrachtendes Bestimmen des Vorhandenen möglich sei ...' Here too we follow the older editions. The newer editions again have 'das' instead of 'als'.
4 'Auf dem Grunde dieser Seinsart zur Welt, die das innerweltlich begegnende Seiende nur noch in seinem puren Aussehen (εἶδος) begegnen lässt, und als Modus dieser Seinsart ist ein ausdruckliches Hinsehen auf das so Begenende möglich.'
5 'Solches Hinsehen kommt selbst in den Modus eines eigenständigen Sichaufhaltens bei dem innerweltlichen Seienden.'