139 I. 3
Being and Time

When we speak of deseverance as a kind of Being which Dasein has with regard to its Being-in-the-world, we do not understand by it any such thing as remoteness (or closeness) or even a distance.1 We use the expression "deseverance"* in a signification which is both active and transitive. It stands for a constitutive state of Dasein's Being-a state with regard to which removing something in the sense of putting it away is only a determinate factical mode. "De-severing"* amounts to making the farness vanish-that is, making the remoteness of something disappear, bringing it close.2 Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be encountered close by as the entity which it is. De-severance discovers remoteness; and remoteness, like distance, is a determinate categorial characteristic of entities whose nature is not that of Dasein. De-severance*, however, is an existentiale; this must be kept in mind. Only to the extent that entities are revealed for Dasein in their deseveredness [Entferntheit], do 'remotenesses' ["Entfernungen"] and distances with regard to other things become accessible in entities within-the-world themselves. Two points are just as little desevered from one another as two Things, for neither of these types of entity has the kind of Being which would make it capable of desevering. They merely have a measurable distance between them, which we can come across in our de-severing.

Proximally and for the most part, de-severing3 is a circumspective

1 'Abstand'. Heidegger uses three words which might be translated as 'distance' : 'Ferne' (our 'farness'), 'Entfernung' (our 'deseverance'), and 'Abstand' ('distance' in the sense of a measurable interval). We shall reserve 'distance' for 'Abstand'.

2 'Entfernen* besagt ein Verschwindenmachen der Ferne, d. h. der Entferntheit von etwas, Naherung.'

3 This hyphen is found only in the later editions.