OUR analysis of the worldhood of the world has constantly been bringing the whole phenomenon of Being-in-the-world into view, although its constitutive items have not all stood out with the same phenomenal distinctness as the phenomenon of the world itself. We have Interpreted the world ontologically by going through what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; and this Interpretation has been put first, because Dasein, in its everydayness (with regard to which Dasein remains a constant theme for study), not only is in a world but comports itself towards that world with one predominant kind of Being. Proximally and for the most part Dasein is fascinated with its world. Dasein is thus absorbed in the world; the kind of Being which it thus possesses, and in general the Being-in which underlies it, are essential in determining the character of a phenomenon which [114] we are now about to study. We shall approach this phenomenon by asking who it is that Dasein is in its everydayness. AU the structures ofBeing which belong to Dasein, together with the phenomenon which provides the answer to this question of the "who", are ways of its Being. To characterize these ontologically is to do so existentially. We must therefore pose the question correctly and outline the procedure for bringing into view a broader phenomenal domain of Dasein's everydayness. By directing our researches towards the phenomenon which is to provide us with an answer to the question of the "who", we shall be led to certain structures of Dasein which are equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world: Being-with and Dasein-with [Mitsein und Mitdasein]. In this kind of Being is grounded the mode of everyday Being-one's-Self [Selbstsein]; the explication of this mode will
1 'Das Man'. In German one may write 'man glaubt' where in French one would write 'on croit', or in English 'they believe', 'one believes', or 'it is believed'. But the German 'man' and the French 'on' are specialized for. such construction in a way in which the pronouns 'they', 'one', and 'it' are not. There is accordingly no single idiomatic translation for the German 'man' which will not sometimes lend itself to ambiguity, and in general we have chosen whichever construction seems the most appropriate in its context. But when Heidegger introduces this word with a definite article and writes 'das Man', as he does very often in this chapter, we shall translate this express1on as the "they"', trusting that the reader will not take this too literally.