157 I. 4
Being and Time

in the world. The Other can be missing only in1 and for1 a Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with ; its very possibility is the proof of this. On the other hand, factical Being-alone is not obviated by the occurrence of a second example of a human being 'beside' me, or by ten such examples. Even if these and more are present-at-hand, Dasein can still be alone. So Being-with and the facticity of Being with one another are not based on the occurrence together of several 'subjects'. Yet Being-alone [121] 'among' many does not mean that with regard to their Being they are merely present-at-hand there alongside us. Even in our Being 'among them' they are there with us; their Dasein-with is encountered in a mode in which they are indifferent and alien. Being missing and 'Being away' [Das Fehlen und "Fortsein"] are modes of Dasein-with, and are possible only because Dasein as Being-with lets the Dasein of Others be encountered in its world. Being-with is in every case a characteristic of one's own Dasein; Dasein-with characterizes the Dasein of Others to the extent that it is freed by its world for a Being-with. Only so far as one's own Dasein has the essential structure of Being-with, is it Dasein-with as encounterable for Others.2

If Dasein-with remains existentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world, then, like our circumspective dealings with the ready-to-hand within-the-world (which, by way of anticipation, we have called 'concern'), it must be Interpreted in terms of the phenomenon of care; for as "care" the Being of Dasein in general is to be defined.3 (Compare Chapter 6 of this Division.) Concern is a character-of-Being which Being-with cannot have as its own, even though Being-with, like concern, is a Being towards entities encountered within-the-world. But those entities towards which Dasein as Being-with comports itself do not have the kind of Being which belongs to equipment ready-to-hand; they are themselves Dasein. These entities are not objects of concern, but rather of solicitude.4

1 Italics supplied in the later editions.

2 '... Mitdasein charakterisiert das Dasein anderer, sofern es für ein Mitsein durch dessen Welt freigegeben ist. Das eigene Dasein ist, sofern es die Wesensstruktur des Mitseins hat, als für Andere begegnend Mitdasein.'

3 '... als welche das Sein des Daseins überhaupt bestimmt wird.' The older editions omit 'wird'.

4 'Dieses Seiende wird nicht besorgt, sondern steht in der Fürsorge.' There is no good English equivalent for 'Fürsorge', which we shall usually translate by 'solicitude'. The more literal 'caring-for' has the connotation of 'being fond of', which we do not want here; 'personal care' suggests personal hygiene; 'personal concern' suggests one's personal business or affairs. 'Fürsorge' is rather the kind of care which we find in 'prenatal care' or 'taking care of the children', or even the kind of care which is administered by welfare agencies. Indeed the word 'Fürsorge' is regularly used in contexts where we would speak of 'welfare work' or 'social welfare; this is the usage which Heidegger has in mind in his discussion of 'Fürsorge' as 'a factical social arrangement'. (The etymological connection between 'Sorge ('care'), 'Fürsorge' ('solicitude'), and 'Besorgen ('concern'), is entirely lost in our translation.)

Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger