204 I. 5
Being and Time

of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion. That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called "meaning". That which gets articulated as such in discursive Articulation, we call the "totality-of-significations" [Bedeutungsganze]. This can be dissolved or broken up into significations. Significations, as what has been Articulated from that which can be Articulated, always carry meaning [... sind ... sinnhaft]. If discourse, as the Articulation of the intelligibility of the "there", is a primordial existentiale of disclosedness, and if disclosedness is primarily constituted by Being-in-the-world, then discourse too must have essentially a kind of Being which is specifically worldly. The intelligibility of Being-in-the-world—an intelligibility which goes with a state-of-mind— expresses itself as discourse . The totality-of-significations of intelligibility is put into words. To significations, words accrue. But word-Things do not get supplied with significations.

The way in which discourse gets expressed is language.1 Language is a totality of words-a totality in which discourse has a 'worldly' Being of its own; and as an entity within-the-world, this totality thus becomes something which we may come across as ready-to-hand. Language can be broken up into word-Things which are present-at-hand. Discourse is existentially language, because that entity whose disclosedness it Articulates according to significations, has, as its kind of Being, Being-in-the-world—a Being which has been thrown and submitted to the 'world'.

As an existential state in which Dasein is disclosed, discourse is constitutive for Dasein's existence. Hearing and keeping silent [Schweigen] are possibilities belonging to discursive speech. In these phenomena the constitutive function of discourse for the existentiality of existence becomes entirely plain for the first time. But in the first instance the issue is one of working out the structure of discourse as such.

Discoursing or talking is the way in which we articulate 'significantly' the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world. Being-with belongs to Being-in-the-world, which in every case maintains itself in some definite way of concernful Being-with-one-another. Such Being-with-one-another is discursive as assenting or refusing, as demanding or warning, as pronouncing, consulting, or interceding, as 'making assertions', and as talking in the way of 'giving a talk'.2 Talking is talk about something. That which the discourse is about [das Worüber der Rede] does not necessarily [162] or even for the most part serve as the theme for an assertion in

1 'Die Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede ist die Sprache.'

2 'Dieses ist redend als zu- und absagen, auffordern, warnen, als Aussprache, Rucksprache, Fürsprache, ferner als "Aussagen machen" und als reden in der Weise des "Redenhaltens".'


Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger