As a state-of-mind which will satisfy these methodological requirements, the phenemonon of anxiety1 will be made basic for our analysis. In working out this basic state-of-mind and characterizing ontologically what is disclosed in it as such, we shall take the phenomenon of falling as our point of departure, and distinguish anxiety from the kindred phenomenon of fear, which we have analysed earlier. As one of Dasein's possibilities of Being, anxiety—together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it—provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein's primordial totality of Being. Dasein's Being reveals itself as care. If we are to work out this basic existential phenomenon, we must distinguish it from phenomena which might be proximally identified with care, such as will, wish, addiction, and urge.2 Care cannot be derived from these, since they themselves are founded upon it.
Like every ontological analysis, the ontological Interpretation of Dasein as care, with whatever we may gain from such an Interpretation, lies far from what is accessible to the pre-ontological understanding of Being or even to our ontical acquaintance with entities. It is not surprising that when the common understanding has regard to that with which it has only ontical familiarity, that which is known ontologically seems rather strange to it. In spite of this, even the ontical approach with which we [183] have tried to Interpret Dasein ontologically as care, may appear far-fetched and theoretically contrived, to say nothing of the act of violence one might discern in our setting aside the confirmed traditional definition of "man". Accordingly our existential Interpretation of Dasein as care requires pre-ontological confirmation. This lies in demonstrating that no sooner has Dasein expressed anything about itself to itself, than it has already interpreted itself as care (cura), even though it has done so only pre-ontologically.
The analytic of Dasein, which is proceeding towards the phenomenon of care, is to prepare the way for the problematic of fundamental ontology—the question of the meaning of Being in general. In order that we may turn our glance explicitly upon this in the light of what we have gained, and go beyond the special task of an existentially a priori anthropology, we must look back and get a more penetrating grasp of the phenomena which are most intimately connected with our leading question—the question of Being. These phenomena are those very ways of Being which we have been hitherto explaining: readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand, as attributes
1 'Angst'. While this word has generally been translated as 'anxiety' in the postFreudian psychological literature, it appears as 'dread' in the translations ofKierkegaard and in a number of discussions ofHeidegger. In some ways 'uneasiness' or 'malaise' would be more appropriate still.
2 '... Wille, Wunsch, Hang und Drang.' For further discussion see H. 194 ff. below.