always also absorbed in the world of its concern. In this falling Being-alongside . . ., fleeing in the face of uncanniness (which for the most part remains concealed with latent anxiety, since the publicness of the "they" suppresses everything unfamiliar), announces itself, whether it does so explicitly or not, and whether it is understood or not. Ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-a-world essentially includes one's falling and one's Being alongside those things ready-to-hand within-the-world with which one concerns oneself.
The formally existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole must therefore be grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). This Being fills in the signification of the term "care" [Sorge], which is used in a purely ontologicoexistential manner. From this signification every tendency of Being which one might have in mind ontically, such as worry [Besorgnis] or carefreeness [Sorglosigkeit], is ruled out.
Because Being-in-the-world is essentially care, Being-alongside the  ready-to-hand could be taken in our previous analyses as concern, and being with the Dasein-with of Others as we encounter it within-the-world could be taken as solicitude.1 Being-alongside something is concern, because it is defined as a way of Being-in by its basic structure-care. Care does not characterize just existentiality, let us say, as detached from facticity and falling; on the contrary, it embraces the unity of these ways in which Being may be characterized. So neither does "care" stand primarily and exclusively for an isolated attitude of the "I" towards itself. If one were to construct the expression 'care for oneself' ["Selbst-sorge"], following the analogy of "concern" [Besorgen] and "solicitude" [Fürsorge], this would be a tautology. "Care" cannot stand for some special attitude towards the Self; for the Self has already been characterized ontologically by "Being-ahead-of-itself", a characteristic in which the other two items in the structure of care—Being-already-in . . . and Being-alongside . . .—have been jointly posited [mitgesetzt].
In Being-ahead-of-oneself as Being towards one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, lies the existential-ontological condition for the possibility of Being-free for authentic existentiell possibilities. For the sake of its potentiality-for-Being, any Dasein is as it factically is. But to the extent that this Being towards its potentiality-for-Being is itself characterized by freedom, Dasein can comport itself towards its possibilities, even unwilling; it can be inauthentically; and factically it is inauthentically, proximally and for the most part. The authentic "for-the-sake-of-which" has not been taken
1 Cf. H. 121 and 131 above.