238 I. 6
Being and Time

hold of; the projection of one's own potentiality-for-Being has been abandoned to the disposal of the "they". Thus when we speak of "Beingahead- of-itself'', the 'itself' which we have in mind is in each case the Self in the sense of the they-self. Even in inauthenticity Dasein remains essentially ahead of itself, just as Dasein's fleeing in the face of itself as it falls, still shows that it has the state-of-Being of an entity for which its Being is an issue.

Care, as a primordial structural totality, lies 'before' ["vor"] every factical 'attitude' and 'situation' of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means that it always lies in them. So this phenomenon by no means expresses a priority of the 'practical' attitude over the theoretical. When we ascertain something present-at-hand by merely beholding it, this activity has the character of care just as much as does a 'political action' or taking a rest and enjoying oneself. 'Theory' and 'practice' are possibilities of Being for an entity whose Being must be defined as "care".

The phenomenon of care in its totality is essentially something that cannot be tom asunder; so any attempts to trace it back to special acts [194] or drives like willing and wishing or urge and addiction,1 or to construct it out of these, will be unsuccessful.

Willing and wishing are rooted with ontological necessity in Dasein as care; they are not just ontologically undifferentiated Experiences occurring in a 'stream' which is completely indefinite with regard to the meaning of its Being. This is no less the case with urge and addiction. These too are grounded in care so far as they can be exhibited in Dasein at all. This does not prevent them from being ontologically constitutive even for entities that merely 'live'. But the basic ontological state of 'living' is a problem in its own right and can be tackled only reductively and privatively in terms of the ontology of Dasein.

Care is ontologically 'earlier' than the phenomena we have just mentioned, which admittedly can, within certain limits, always be 'described' appropriately without our needing to have the full ontological horizon visible, or even to be familiar with it at all. From the standpoint of our present investigation in fundamental ontology, which aspires neither to a thematically complete ontology of Dasein nor even to a concrete anthropology, it must suffice to suggest how these phenomena are grounded existentially in care.

That very potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which Dasein is, has Being-in-the-world as its kind of Being. Thus it implies ontologically a relation to entities within-the-world. Care is always concern and solicitude,

1 '... besondere Akte oder Triebe wie Wollen und Wünschen oder Drang und Hang ... ' Cf. H. 182.

Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger