something. The 'generalization' is rather one that is ontological and a priori. What it has in view is not a set of ontical properties which constantly keep emerging, but a state of Being which is already underlying in every case, and which first makes it ontologically possible for this entity to be addressed ontically as "cura". The existential condition for the possibility of 'the cares of life' and 'devotedness', must be conceived as care, in a sense which is primordial-that is ontological.
The transcendental 'generality' of the phenomenon of care and of [200] all fundamental existentialia is, on the other hand, broad enough to present a basis on which every interpretation of Dasein which is ontical and belongs to a world-view must move, whether Dasein is understood as affiiction [Not] and the 'cares of life' or in an opposite manner.
The very 'emptiness' and 'generality' which obtrude themselves ontically in existential structures, have an ontological definiteness and fullness of their own. Thus Dasein's whole constitution itself iS not simple in its unity, but shows a structural articulation; in the existential conception of care, this articulation becomes expressed.
Thus, by our ontological Interpretation of Dasein, we have been brought to the existential conception of care from Dasein's pre-ontological interpretation of itself as 'care'. Yet the analytic of Dasein is not aimed at laying an ontological basis for anthropology; its purpose is one of fundamental ontology. This is the purpose that has tacitly determined the course of our considerations hitherto, our selection of phenomena, and the limits to which our analysis may proceed. Now, however, with regard to our leading question of the meaning of Being and our way of working this out, our investigation must give us explicit assurance as to what we have so far achieved. But this sort of thing is not to be reached by superficially taking together what we have discussed. Rather, with the help of what we have achieved, that which could be indicated only crudely at the beginning of the existential analytic, must now be concentrated into a more penetrating understanding of the problem.
¶ 43. Dasein, Worldhood, and Reality
The question of the meaning of Being becomes possible at all only if there is something like an understanding of Being. Understanding of Being belongs to the kind of Being which the entity called "Dasein" possesses. The more appropriately and primordially we have succeeded in explicating this entity, the surer we are to attain our goal in the further course of working out the problem of fundamental ontology.
In our pursuit of the tasks of a preparatory existential analytic ofDasein,