regard to which they can agree? If it is impossible for intellectus and res to be equal because they are not of the same species, are they then perhaps similar? But knowledge is still supposed to 'give' the thing just as it is. This 'agreement' has the Relational character of the ust as' ["So—Wie"]. In what way is this relation possible as a relation between intellectus and res? From these questions it becomes plain that to clarify the structure of truth it is not enough simply to presuppose this relational totality, but we must go back and inquire into the context of Being which provides the support for this totality as such.
Must we, however, bring up here the 'epistemological' problematic as regards the subject-Object relation, or can our analysis restrict itself to Interpreting the 'immanent consciousness of truth', and thus remain 'within the sphere' of the subject? According to the general opinion, what is true is knowledge. But knowledge is judging. In judgment one must distinguish between the judging as a Real psychical process, and that which is judged, as an ideal content. It will be said of the latter that it is 'true'. The Real psychical process, however, is either present-at-hand or not. According to this opinion, the ideal content of judgment stands in a relationship of agreement. This relationship thus pertains to a connection between an ideal content of judgment and the Real Thing as that which is judged about. Is this agreement Real or ideal in its kind of Being, or neither of these? How are we to take ontologically the relation between an ideal entity and something that is Real and present-at-hand? Such a relation indeed subsists [besteht] ; and in factical judgments it subsists not only as a relation between the content of judgment and the Real Object, but likewise as a relation between the ideal content and the Real act of judgment. And does it manifestly subsist 'more inwardly' in this latter case?
Or is the ontological meaning of the relation between Real and ideal (μέθεξις) something about which we must not inquire? Yet the relation is to be one which subsists. What does such "subsisting" [Bestand] mean ontologically?
Why should this not be a legitimate question? Is it accidental that no headway has been made with this problem in over two thousand years? Has  the question already been perverted in the very way it has been approached—in the ontologically unclarified separation of the Real and the ideal?
And with regard to the 'actual' judging of what is judged, is the separation of the Real act of judgment from the ideal content altogether unjustified? Does not the actuality of knowing and judging get broken asunder into two ways of Being—two 'levels' which can never be pieced together in such a manner as to reach the kind of Being that belongs to knowing? Is not psychologism correct in holding out against this separation, even