282 II. 1
Being and Time

Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more, the phenomenal content is missed, inasmuch as in the entity which still remains we are not presented with a mere corporeal Thing. From a theoretical point of view, even the corpse which is present-at-hand is still a possible object for the student of pathological anatomy, whose understanding tends to be oriented to the idea of life. This something which is just-present-at-hand-and-no-more is 'more' than a lifeless material Thing. In it we encounter something unalive, which has lost its life.1

But even this way of characterizing that which still remains [des Nochverbleibenden] does not exhaust the full phenomenal findings with regard to Dasein.

The 'deceased' [Der "Verstorbene"] as distinct from the dead person [dem Gestorbenen] , has been torn away from those who have 'remained behind' [den "Hinterbliebenen"], and is an object of 'concern' in the ways of funeral rites, interment, and the cult of graves. And that is so because the deceased, in his kind of Being, is 'still more' than just an item of equipment, environmentally ready-to-hand, about which one can be concerned. In tarrying alongside him in their mourning and commemoration, those who have remained behind are with him, in a mode of respectful solicitude. Thus the relationship-of-Being which one has towards the dead is not to be taken as a concernful Being-alongside something ready-to-hand.

In such Being-with the dead [dem Toten] , the deceased himself is no longer factically 'there'. However, when we speak of "Being-with", we always have in view Being with one another in the same world. The deceased has abandoned our 'world' and left it behind. But in terms of that world [Aus ihr her] those who remain can still be with him.

The greater the phenomenal appropriateness with which we take the no-longer-Dasein of the deceased, the more plainly is it shown that in [239] such Being-with the dead, the authentic Being-come-to-an-end [Zuendegekommensein] of the deceased is precisely the sort of thing which we do not experience. Death does indeed reveal itself as a loss, but a loss such as is experienced by those who remain. In suffering this loss, however, we have no way of access to the loss-of-Being as such which the dying man 'suffers'. The dying of Others is not something which we experience in a genuine sense ; at most we are always just 'there alongside'.2

And even if, by thus Being there alongside, it were possible and feasible


1 'Das Nur-noch-Vorhandene ist "mehr" als ein lebloses materielles Ding. Mit ihm begegnet ein des Lebens verlustig gegangenes Unlebendiges.'

2 '... sind ... "dabei".' Literally the verb 'dabeisein' means simply 'to be at that place', 'to be there alongside' ; but it also has other connotations which give an ironical touch to this passage, for it may also mean, 'to be engaged in' some activity, 'to be at it', 'to be in the swim', 'to be ready to be "counted in"'.


Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger