350 II. 2
Being and Time

undisguisedly into every potentiality-for-Being of which Dasein factically takes hold ? What if it is only in the anticipation of [zum] death that resoluteness, as Dasein's authentic truth, has reached the authentic certainty which belongs to it? What if it is only in the anticipation if death that all the factical 'anticipatoriness' of resolving would be authentically understood—in other words, that it would be caught up with in an existentiell way?1

In our existential Interpretation, the entity which has been presented to us as our theme has Dasein's kind of Being, and cannot be pieced together into something present-at-hand out of pieces which are present-athand. So long as we do not forget this, every step in our Interpretation must be guided by the idea of existence. What this signifies for the question of the possible connection between anticipation and resoluteness, is nothing less than the demand that we should project these existential [303] phenomena upon the existentiell possibilities which have been delineated in them, and 'think these possibilities through to the end' in an existential manner. If we do this, the working-out of anticipatory resoluteness as a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole such that this potentiality is authentic and is possible in an existentiell way, will lose the character of an arbitrary construction. It will have become a way of Interpreting whereby Dasein is liberated for its uttermost possibility of existence.

In taking this step, the existential Interpretation makes known at the same time its ownmost methodological character. Up till now, except for some remarks which were occasionally necessary, we have deferred explicit discussions of method. Our first task was to 'go forth' towards the phenomena. But, before laying bare the meaning of the Being of an entity which has been revealed in its basic phenomenal content, we must stop for a while in the course of our investigation, not for the purpose of 'resting', but so that we may be impelled the more keenly.

Any genuine method is based on viewing in advance in an appropriate way the basic constitution of the 'object' to be disclosed, or of the domain within which the object lies. Thus any genuinely methodical consideration—which is to be distinguished from empty discussions of technique—must likewise give information about the kind of Being of the entity which has been taken as our theme. The clarification of the methodological possibilities, requirements, and limitations of the existential analytic in general, can alone secure the transparency which is necessary if we are to


1 'Wenn im Vorlaufen zum Tode erst alle faktische "Vorläufigkeit" des Entschliessens eigentlich verstanden, das heisst existenziell eingeholt ware ?' Our translation of 'Vorlaufen' as 'anticipation' again fails to bring out the metaphor of 'running ahead', with which the notion of 'catching up' is here clearly connected. (Cf. our note 3, p. 306, H. 262 above.) Similarly our translation of 'Vorläufigkeit' as 'anticipatoriness', which brings out the connection with 'vorlaufen', is out of line with our usual translation of the adjective 'vorläufig' as 'provisional'.


Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger