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Being and Time

take the basic step of unveiling the meaning of the Being of care. But the Interpretation of the ontological meaning of care must be performed on the basis of envisaging phenomenologically in a full and constant manner Dasein's existential constitution as we have exhibited it up till now.

Ontologically, Dasein is in principle different from everything that is present-at-hand or Real. Its 'subsistence' is not based on the substantiality of a substance but on the 'Self-subsistence' of the existing Self, whose Being has been conceived as care.1 The phenomenon of the Self—a phenomenon which is included in care—needs to be defined existentially in a way which is primordial and authentic, in contrast to our preparatory exhibition of the inauthentic they-self. Along with this, we must establish what possible ontological questions are to be directed towards the 'Self', if indeed it is neither substance nor subject.

In this way, the phenomenon of care will be adequately clarified for the first time, and we shall then interrogate it as to its ontological meaning. When this meaning has been determined, temporality will have been laid bare. In exhibiting this, we are not led into out-of-the-way and sequestered [304] domains of Dasein; we merely get a conception of the entire phenomenal content of Dasein's basic existential constitution in the ultimate foundations of its own ontological intelligibility. Temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial way in Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole, in the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness. If temporality makes itself known primordially in this, then we may suppose that the temporality of anticipatory resoluteness is a distinctive mode of temporality. Temporality has different possibilities and different ways of temporalizing itself.2 The basic possibilities

1 'Sein "Bestand" gründet nicht in der Substanzialität einer Substanz, sondem in der "Selbständigkeit" des existierenden Selbst, dessen Sein als Sorge begriffen wurde. '

In this sentence Heidegger has used no less than five words derived from the Indo-European base 'stä-' (Cf. English 'stand', Latin 'stare', German 'stehen'): 'Bestand', 'Substanz', 'Substantialität', 'Selbständigkeit', 'existierenden'. In each case we have used an English equivalent derived from the same base.

The important word 'Bestand', which we have here translated somewhat arbitrarily as 'subsistence', and have often handled elsewhere in other ways, corresponds to the verb 'bestehen' ('to subsist', 'to remain', 'to consist in', even 'to exist' in a broader sense than Heidegger's). It thus may stand for 'subsistence' in the broadest sense, or more particularly for 'continued subsistence'; and it may also stand for that of which something 'consists—its 'content', the whole 'stock' of things of which it consists. This is the sense in which Heidegger most frequently uses it, especially in such phrases as 'der phänomenale Bestand' ('the phenomenal content', 'the stock of phenomena').

We have also somewhat arbitrarily translated 'Selbständigkeit' as 'Self-subsistence', in accordance with our translation of the adjective 'selbständig' on H. 291-292· But as we shall see later (H. 322), 'Self-constancy' would perhaps be more appropriate.

2 'Zeitlichkeit kann sich in verschiedenen Möglichkeiten und in verschiedener Weise zeitigen.' In ordinary German the verb 'zeitigen' means 'to bring about' or more strictly, 'to bring to maturity'; this is how we have translated it in the earlier portions of this work. In the present section, however, and in those which follow, Heidegger is exploiting the etymological connection of 'zeitigen' with such words as 'Zeit' ('time') and 'Zeitlichkeit' ('temporality'); we have accordingly ventured to translate it as 'to temporalize.' We have already called attention to earlier passages (H. 122, 178) where 'zeitigen' has been changed to 'zeigen' in the later editions. If these changes are not simple misprints, they may indicate a deliberate intention to avoid the use of this verb in any sense but the special one here introduced. (Contrast H. 152, where no such correction has been made.)

Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger