II. 3 355
Being and Time

indebtedness has been paid off; and wanting-to-have-a-conscience signifies that one is ready for the appeal to this ownmost Being-guilty. This prior Being-guilty, which is constantly with us, does not show itself unconcealedly in its character as prior until this very priority has been enlisted in [hineingestellt] that possibility which is simply not to be outstripped. When, in anticipation, resoluteness has caught up [eingeholt] the possibility of death into its potentiality-for-Being, Dasein's authentic existence can no longer be outstripped [überholt] by anything.

The phenomenon of resoluteness has brought us before the primordial truth of existence. As resolute, Dasein is revealed to itself in its current factical potentiality-for-Being, and in such a way that Dasein itself is this revealing and Being-revealed. To any truth, there belongs a corresponding holding-for-true. The explicit appropriating of what has been disclosed or discovered is Being-certain. The primordial truth of existence demands an equiprimordial Being-certain, in which one maintains oneself in what resoluteness discloses. It1 gives itself the current factical Situation, and brings itself into that Situation. The Situation cannot be calculated in advance or presented like something present-at-hand which is waiting for someone to grasp it. It merely gets disclosed in a free resolving which has not been determined beforehand but is open to the possibility of such determination. What, then, does the certainty which belongs to such resoluteness signify? Such certainty must maintain itself in what is disclosed by the resolution. But this means that it simply cannot become rigid as regards the Situation, but must understand that the resolution, in accordance with its own meaning as a disclosure, must be held open and free for the current factical possibility. The certainty of the resolution signifies that one holds [308] oneself free for the possibility of taking it back—a possibility which is factically necessary.2 However, such holding-for-true in resoluteness (as the truth of existence) by no means lets us fall back into irresoluteness. On the contrary, this holding-for-true, as a resolute holding-oneself-free for taking back, is authentic resoluteness which resolves to keep repeating itself.3 Thus, in

1 Heidegger's ambiguous pronoun refers to 'resoluteness', as is clear from H. 326 below.

2 'Die Gewissheit des Entschlusses bedeutet: Sichfreihalten für seine mögliche und je faktisch notwendige Zurücknahme.' It is not grammatically clear whether the possessive adjective 'seine' refers back to 'Entschlusses' ('resolution') or to the 'Sich-' of 'Sichfteihalten' ('oneself'). We have chosen the former interpretation as somewhat more natural. But it is tempting to construe this and the following sentence as preparing the way for Heidegger's remark a few lines below that 'In seinem Tod muss sich das Dasein schlechthin "zurücknehmen" '—which might be translated as 'In its death, Dasein must 'withdraw' itself utterly.' In that case it would be attractive to translate the present sentence by writing '... holds oneself free for one's own withdrawal ...'

3 '... eigentliche Entschlossenheit zur Wiederholung ihrer selbst.' The idea seems to be that authentic resoluteness keeps reiterating itself in the face of a constant awareness that it may have to be retracted or taken back at any time.

Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger