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Being and Time

categories of Reality.xiii Care already harbours in itself the phenomenon of the Self, if indeed the thesis is correct that the expression 'care for oneself' ["Selbstsorge"], would be tautological if it were proposed in conformity with the term "solicitude" [Fürsorge] as care for Others.xiv But in that case the problem of defining ontologically the Selfhood of Dasein gets sharpened to the question of the existential 'connection' between care and Selfhood.

To clarify the existentiality of the Self, we take as our 'natural' point of departure Dasein's everyday interpretation of the Self. In saying "I", Dasein expresses itself about 'itself'. It is not necessary that in doing so Dasein should make any utterance. With the 'I', this entity has itself in view. The content of this expression is regarded as something utterly simple. In each case, it just stands for me and nothing further. Also, this 'I', as something simple, is not an attribute of other Things; it is not itself a predicate, but the absolute 'subject'. What is expressed and what is addressed in saying "I", is always met as the same persisting something. The characteristics of 'simplicity', 'substantiality', and 'personality', which Kant, for instance, made the basis for his doctrine 'of the paralogisms of pure reason',xv arise from a genuine pre-phenomenological experience. The question remains whether that which we have experienced ontically in this way may be Interpreted ontologically with the help of the 'categories' mentioned.

Kant, indeed, in strict conformity with the phenomenal content given in saying "I", shows that the ontical theses about the soul-substance which have been inferred [erschlossenen] from these characteristics, are without justification. But in so doing, he merely rejects a wrong ontical explanation of the "I"; he has by no means achieved an ontological Interpretation ofSelfhood, nor has he even obtained some assurance of it and made positive preparation for it. Kant makes a more rigorous attempt than his predecessors to keep hold of the phenomenal content of saying "I"; yet even though in theory he has denied that the ontical foundations of the ontology of the substantial [319] apply to the "I", he still slips back into this same inappropriate ontology. This will be shown more exactly, in order that we may establish what it means ontologically to take saying "I" as the starting-point for the analysis of Self hood. The Kantian analysis of the 'I think' is now to be adduced as an illustration, but only so far as is demanded for clarifying these problems.xvi

The 'I' is a bare consciousness, accompanying all concepts. In the 'I', 'nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts'. 'Consciousness in itself (is) not so much a representation . . . as it is a form of representation in general.'xvii The 'I think' is 'the form of apperception, which clings to every experience and precedes it'.xviii


Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger