368 II. 3
Being and Time

'I think something', and above all, without seeing what is ontologically 'presupposed' in taking the 'I think something' as a basic characteristic of the Self. For even the 'I think something' is not definite enough ontologically as a starting-point, because the 'something' remains indefinite. If by this "something" we understand an entity within-the-world, then it tacitly implies that the world has been presupposed; and this very phenomenon of the world co-determines the state of Being of the "1", if indeed it is to be possible for the "I" to be something like an 'I think something'. In saying "I", I have in view the entity which in each case I am as an 'lam- in-a-world'. Kant did not see the phenomenon of the world, and was consistent enough to keep the 'representations' apart from the a priori content of the 'I think'. But as a consequence the "I" was again forced back to an isolated subject, accompanying representations in a way which is ontologically quite indefinite.xx

In saying "!", Dasein expresses itself as Being-in-the-world. But does saying "I" in the everyday manner have itself in view as being-in-the-world [in-der-Welt-seiend] ? Here we must make a distinction. When saying "I", Dasein surely has in view the entity which, in every case, it is itself. The everyday interpretation of the Self, however, has a tendency to understand itself in terms of the 'world' with which it is concerned. When Dasein has itself in view ontically, it fails to see itself in relation to the kind of Being of that entity which it is itself. And this holds especially for the basic state, of Dasein, Being-in-the-world.xxi

What is the motive for this 'fugitive' way of saying "I" ? It is motivated by Dasein's falling; for as falling, it flees in the face of itself into the "they".1 When the "I" talks in the 'natural' manner, this is performed by the they-self.2 What expresses itself in the 'I' is that -Self which, proximally and for the most part, I am not authentically. When one is absorbed in the everyday multiplicity and the rapid succession [Sich-jagen] of that with which one is concerned, the Self of the self-forgetful "I am concerned' shows itself as something simple which is constantly selfsame but indefinite and empty. Yet one is that with which one concerns oneself. In the 'natural' ontical way in which the "I" talks, the phenomenal content of the Dasein which one has in view in the "I" gets overlooked; but this gives no justification for our joining in this overlooking of it, or for forcing upon the problematic of the Self an inappropriate 'categorial' horizon when we Interpret the "I" ontologically.

Of course by thus refusing to follow the everyday way in which the "I"

1 'Durch das Verfallen des Daseins, als welches es vor sich selbst flieht in das Man.' The 'es' appears only in the later editions.

2 'Die "natürliche" Ich-Rede vollzieht das Man-selbst.'