372 II. 3
Being and Time

"upon-which", is what 'really' 'has meaning' first of all. Entities 'have' meaning only because, as Being which has been disclosed beforehand, they become intelligible in the projection of that Being—that is to say, in terms of the "upon-which" of that projection. The primary projection [325] of the understanding of Being 'gives' the meaning. The question about the meaning of the Being of an entity takes as its theme the "upon-which" of that understanding of Being which underlies all Being of entities.1

Dasein is either authentically or inauthentically disclosed to itself as regards its existence. In existing, Dasein understands itself, and in such a way, indeed, that this understandin gdoes not merely get something in its grasp, but makes up the existentiell Being of its factical potentiality-forBeing. The Being which is disclosed is that of an entity for which this Being is an issue. The meaning of this Being—that is, of care—is what makes care possible in its Constitution; and it is what makes up primordially the Being of this potentiality-for-Being. The meaning of Dasein's Being is not something free-floating which is other than and 'outside of' itself, but is the self-understanding Dasein itself. What makes possible the Being of Dasein, and therewith its factical existence?

That which was projected in the primordial existential projection of existence has revealed itself as anticipatory resoluteness. What makes this authentic Being-a-whole of Dasein possible with regard to the unity of its articulated structural whole?2 Anticipatory resoluteness, when taken formally and existentially, without our constantly designating its full structural content, is Being towards one's ownmost, distinctive potentiality-for-Being. This sort of thing is possible only in that Dasein can, indeed, come towards itself in its ownmost possibility, and that it can put up with this possibility as a possibility in thus letting itself come towards itself—in other words, that it exists. This letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards.3 If either authentic or


1 'Die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins eines Seienden macht das Woraufhin des allem Sein von Seiendem zugrundeliegenden Seinsverstehens zum Thema.' The earlier editions read '... des all em ontischen Sein zu Seiendem ...' ('... all ontical Being towards entities . . .')

2 'Was ermöglicht dieses eigentliche Ganzsein des Daseins hinsichtlich der Einheit seines gegliederten Strukturganzen ?'

3 'Das die ausgezeichnete Möglichkeit aushaltende, in ihr sich auf sich Zukommen-lassen ist das ursprüngliche Phänomen der Zu-kunft.' While the hyphen in 'Zukommen-lassen' appears only in the later editions, the more important hyphen in 'Zu-kunft' appears in both later and earlier editions. In the later editions, however, it comes at the end of the line, so that the force which was presumably intended is lost.

Without the hyphen, 'Zukunft' is the ordinary word for 'the future'; with the hyphen, Heidegger evidently wishes to call attention to its kinship with the expression 'zukommen auf ...' ('to come towards ...' or 'to come up to ...') and its derivation from 'zu' ('to' or 'towards') and 'kommen' ('come'). Hence our hendiadys. (The use of 'zukommen' with the preposition 'auf' is to be distinguished from a use of this same verb with the dative which we have met in earlier chapters in the sense of 'belongs to ...', 'is becoming to ...', or 'has coming to ...'.)


Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger