374 II. 3
Being and Time

Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand in the Situation—that is to say, taking action in such a way as to let one encounter what has presence environmentally—is possible only by making such an entity present. Only as the Present [Gegenwart]1 in the sense of making present, can resoluteness be what it is: namely, letting itself be encountered undisguisedly by that which it seizes upon in taking action.

Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself into the Situation by making present. The character of "having been" arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which "has been" (or better, which "is in the process of having been") releases from itself the Present.2 This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as "temporality".3 Only in so far as Dasein has the definite character of temporality, is the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of anticipatory resoluteness, as we have described it, made possible for Dasein itself. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care.

The phenomenal content of this meaning, drawn from the state of Being of anticipatory resoluteness, fills in the signification of the term "temporality". In our terminological use of this expression, we must hold ourselves aloof from all those significations of 'future', 'past', and 'Present' which thrust themselves upon us from the ordinary conception of time. This holds also for conceptions of a 'time' which is 'subjective' or 'Objective', 'immanent' or 'transcendent'. Inasmuch as Dasein understands itself in a way which, proximally and for the most part, is inauthentic, we may suppose that 'time' as ordinarily understood does indeed represent a genuine phenomenon, but one which is derivative [ein abkünftiges]. It arises from inauthentic temporality, which has a source of its own. The conceptions of 'future', 'past' and 'Present' have first arisen in terms of the inauthentic way of understanding time. In terminologically delimiting [327] the primordial and authentic phenomena which correspond to these, we have to struggle against the same difficulty which keeps all ontological terminology in its grip. When violences are done in this field of investigation, they are not arbitrary but have a necessity grounded in the facts. If, however, we are to point out without gaps in the argument, how inauthentic temporality has its source in temporality which is

1 On our expressions 'having presence', 'making present', and 'the Present', see our notes 1 and 2, p. 47, and 2, p. 48 on H. 25 above.

2 'Die Gewesenheit entspringt der Zukunft, so zwar, dass die gewesene {besser gewesende) Zukunft die Gegenwart aus sich entliisst.' Heidegger has coined the form 'gewesend' by fusing the past participle 'gewesen' with the suffix of the present participle '-end', as if in English one were to write 'beening'.

3 'Dies dergestalt als gewesend-gegenwärtigende Zukunft einheitliche Phänomen nennen wir die Zeitlichkeit.'

Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger