378 II. 3
Being and Time

In enumerating the ecstases, we have always mentioned the future first. We have done this to indicate that the future has a priority in the ecstatical unity of primordial and authentic temporality. This is so, even though temporality does not first arise through a cumulative sequence of the ecstases, but in each case temporalizes itself in their equiprimordiality. But within this equiprimordiality, the modes of temporalizing are different. The difference lies in the fact that the nature of the temporalizing can be determined primarily in terms of the different ecstases. Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes itself in terms of the authentic future and in such a way that in having been futurally, it first of all awakens the Present.1 The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future. The priority of the future will vary according to the ways in which the temporalizing of inauthentic temporality itself is modified, but it will still come to the fore even in the derivative kind of 'time'.2

Care is Being-towards-death. We have defined "anticipatory resoluteness" as authentic Being towards the possibility which we have characterized as Dasein's utter impossibility. In such Being-towards-its-end, Dasein exists in a way which is authentically whole as that entity which it can be when 'thrown into death'. This entity does not have an end at which it just stops, but it exists finitely.3 The authentic future is temporalized primarily [330] by that temporality which makes up the meaning of anticipatory resoluteness; it thus reveals itself as finite.' But 'does not time go on' in spite of my own no-longer-Dasein?5 And can there not be an unlimited number of things which still lie 'in the future' and come along out of it ?

We must answer these questions affirmatively. In spite of this, they do not contain any objections to the finitude of primordial temporality—because this· is something which is no longer handled by these at all. The question is not about everything that still can happen 'in a time that goes on', or about what kind of letting-come-towards-oneself we can encounter 'out of this time', but about how "coming-towards-oneself" is, as such, to be primordially defined. Its finitude does not amount primarily to a stopping, but is a characteristic of temporalization itself. The primordial and authentic future is the "towards-oneself" (to oneself!),6 existing

1 '... dass sie zukünftig gewesen allererst die Gegenwart weckt.'

2 '... noch in der abkünftigen "Zeit".' Here Heidegger is contrasting the authentic kind of time in which Dasein 'comes towards' itself futurally ['auf sich zukommt zukünftig'] with the inauthentic kind of time which 'comes off' from this or is 'derived' from it ['abkommt'], and which is thus of a 'derivative' ['abkünftig'] character.

3 '... sondern existiert endlich.'

4 'Die eigentliche Zukunft, die primär die Zeitlichkeit zeitigt, die den Sinn der vorlaufenden Entschlossenheit ausmacht, enthüllt sich damit selbst als endliche.'

5 'Allein "geht" trotz des Nichtmehrdaseins meiner selbst "die Zeit nicht weiter"?'

6 '... das Auf-sich-zu, auf sich ...'


Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger