386 II. 4
Being and Time

just by having it in view, but it throws itself into it as a possibility. In each case Dasein is understandingly in the way that it can be.1 Resoluteness has turned out to be a kind of existing which is primordial and authentic. Proximally and for the most part, to be sure, Dasein remains irresolute ; that is to say, it remains closed off in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, to which it brings itself only when it has been individualized. This implies that temporality does not temporalize itself constantly out of the authentic future. This inconstancy, however, does not mean that temporality sometimes lacks a future, but rather that the temporalizing of the future takes various forms.

To designate the authentic future terminologically we have reserved the expression "anticipation". This indicates that Dasein, existing authentically, lets itself come towards itself as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being—that [337] the future itself must first win itself, not from a Present, but from the inauthentic future. If we are to provide a formally undifferentiated term for the future, we may use the one with which we have designated the first structural item of care—the "ahead-of-itself". Factically, Dasein is constantly ahead of itself, but inconstantly anticipatory with regard to its existentiell possibility.

How is the inauthentic future to be contrasted with this? Just as the authentic future is revealed in resoluteness, the inauthentic future, as an ecstatical mode, can reveal itself only if we go back ontologically from the inauthentic understanding of everyday concern to its existential-temporal meaning. As care, Dasein is essentially ahead of itself. Proximally and for the most part, concernful Being-in-the-world understands itself in terms of that with which it is concerned. Inauthentic understanding2 projects itself upon that with which one can concern oneself, or upon what is feasible, urgent, or indispensable in our everyday business. But that with which we concern ourselves is as it is for the sake of that potentiality-for-Being which cares. This potentiality lets Dasein come towards itself in its concernful Being-alongside that with which it is concerned. Dasein does not come towards itself primarily in its ownmost non-relational potentiality-for-Being, but it awaits this concernfully in terms of that which yields or denies the object of its concern.3 Dasein comes towards itself from that with which it concerns itself. The inauthentic future has the character of awaiting.4 One's concernful understanding of oneself as they-self in terms


1 'Verstehend ist das Dasein je, wie ea sein kann.'

2 'Das uneigentliche Verstehen ...' Italics only in the later editions.

3 '... sondern es ist besorgend seiner gewärtig aus dem, was das Besorgte ergibt oder versagt.' It is not clear whether 'das Besorgte' or 'was' is the subject of its clause.

4 '... des Gewärtigens.' While the verb 'await' has many advantages as an approximation to 'gewärtigen', it is a bit too colourless and fails to bring out the important idea of being prepared to reckon with that which one awaits.


Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger