390 II. 4
Being and Time

that has been thrown. How does the temporal Constitution of having-a-mood let itself be made visible? How will the ecstatical unity of one's current temporality give any insight into the existential connection between one's state-of-mind and one's understanding?

One's mood discloses in the manner of turning thither or turning away from one's own Dasein. Bringing Dasein face to face with the "that-it-is" of its own thrownness-whether authentically revealing it or inauthentically covering it up-becomes existentially possible only if Dasein's Being, by its very meaning, constantly is as having been. The "been" is not what first brings one face to face with the thrown entity which one is oneself; but the ecstasis of the "been" is what first makes it possible to find oneself in the way of having a state-of-mind.1

Understanding is grounded primarily in the future; one's state-of-mind, however, temporalizes itself primarily in having been.2 Moods temporalize themselves-that is, their specific ecstasis belongs to a future and a Present in such a way, indeed, that these equiprimordial ecstases are modified by having been.

We have emphasized that while moods, of course, are ontically well-known to us [bekannt], they are not recognized [erkannt] in their primordial existential function. They are regarded as fleeting Experiences which 'colour' one's whole 'psychical condition'. Anything which is observed to have the character of turning up and disappearing in a fleeting manner, belongs to the primordial constancy of existence. But all the same, what should moods have in common with 'time'? That these 'Experiences' come and go, that they run their course 'in time', is a trivial thing to establish. Certainly. And indeed this can be established in an ontico-psychological manner. Our task, however, is to exhibit the ontological structure of having-a-mood in its existential-temporal Constitution. And of course this is proximally just a matter of first making the temporality of moods visible. The thesis that 'one's state-of-mind is grounded primarily in having been' means that the existentially basic character of moods lies in bringing one back to something. This bringing-back does not first produce a having been; but in any state-of-mind some mode of having been is made manifest for existential analysis.3 So if we are to Interpret


1 'Das Bringen vor das geworfene Seiende, das man selbst ist, schafft nicht erst das Gewesen, sondem dessen Ekstase ennöglicht erst das Sich-finden in der Weise des Sichbefindens.' We have construed 'das Gewesen' and 'dessen Ekstase' as the subjects of their respective clauses, but other interpretations are not impossible.

2 In our italicization we follow the older editions. In the newer editions 'Gewesenheit' ('having been') is not italicized.

3 'Dieses stellt die Gewesenheit nicht erst her, sondem die Befindlichkeit offenbart fUr die existenziale Analyse je einen Modus der Gewesenheit.' The grammar of the first clause is ambiguous.


Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger