395 II. 4
Being and Time

Yet neither of these moods, fear and anxiety, ever 'occurs' just isolated in the 'stream of Experiences'; each of them determines an understanding or determines itself in terms of one.1 Fear is occasioned by entities with which we concern ourselves environmentally. Anxiety, however, springs from Dasein itself. When fear assails us, it does so from what is within-the-world. Anxiety arises out of Being-in-the-world as thrown Being-towards-death. When understood temporally, this 'mounting' of anxiety out of Dasein, means that the future and the Present of anxiety temporalize themselves out of a primordial Being-as-having-been in the sense of bringing us back to repeatability. But anxiety can mount authentically only in a Dasein which is resolute. He who is resolute knows no fear; but he understands the possibility of anxiety as the possibility of the very mood which neither inhibits nor bewilders him. Anxiety liberates him from possibilities which 'count for nothing' ["nichtigen"], and lets him become free for those which are authentic.

Although both fear and anxiety, as modes of state-of-mind, are grounded primarily in having been, they each have different sources with regard to their own temporalization in the temporality of care. Anxiety springs from the future of resoluteness, while fear springs from the lost Present, of which [345] fear is fearfully apprehensive, so that it falls prey to it more than ever.2

But may not the thesis of the temporality of moods hold only for those phenomena which we have selected for our analysis? How is a temporal meaning to be found in the pallid lack of mood which dominates the 'grey everyday' through and through? And how about the temporality of such moods and affects as hope, joy, enthusiasm, gaiety? Not only fear and anxiety, but other moods, are founded existentially upon one's having been; this becomes plain if we merely mention such phenomena as satiety, sadness, melancholy, and desperation ... Of course these must be Interpreted on the broader basis of an existential analytic of Dasein that has been well worked out. But even a phenomenon like hope, which seems to be founded wholly upon the future, must be analysed in much the same way as fear. Hope has sometimes been characterized as the expectation of a bonum futurum, to distinguish it from fear, which relates itself to a malum futurum. But what is decisive for the structure of hope as a phenomenon, is not so much the 'futural' character of that to which it relates itself

1 Beide Stimmungen, Furcht und Angst, "kommen" jedoch nie nur isoliert "vor" im "Erlebnisstrom", sondem be-stimmen je ein Verstehen, bzw. sich aus einem solchen.' Heidegger writes 'be-stimmen' with a hyphen to call attention to the fact that the words 'bestimmen' ('determine') and 'Stimmung' ('mood') have a common stem.

2 'Die Angst entspringt aus der Zukunft der Entschlossenheit, die Furcht aus der verlorenen Gegenwart, die furchtsam die Furcht befiirchtet, urn ihr so erst recht zu verfallen.' The grammar of this passage is ambiguous, and would also permit us to write: '. . . the lost Present, which is fearfully apprehensive of fear, so that . . .'

Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger