396 II. 4
Being and Time

but rather the existential meaning of hoping itself. Even here its character as a mood lies primarily in hoping as hoping for something for oneself [Fürsich-erhoffen]. He who hopes takes himself with him into his hope, as it were, and brings himself up against what he hopes for. But this presupposes that he has somehow arrived at himself. To say that hope brings alleviation [erleichtert] from depressing misgivings, means merely that even hope, as a state-of-mind, is still related to our burdens, and related in the mode of Being-as-having been. Such a mood of elation—or better, one which elates—is ontologically possible only if Dasein has an ecstatico-temporal relation to the thrown ground of itself.

Furthermore, the pallid lack of mood—indifference—which is addicted to nothing and has no urge for anything, and which abandons itself to whatever the day may bring, yet in so doing takes everything along with it in a certain manner, demonstrates most penetratingly the power of forgetting in the everyday mode of that concern which is closest to us. Just living along [Das Dahinleben] in a way which 'lets' everything 'be' as it is, is based on forgetting and abandoning oneself to one's thrownness. It has the ecstatical meaning of an inauthentic way of having been. Indifference, which can go along with busying oneself head over heels, must be sharply distinguished from equanimity. This latter mood springs from resoluteness, which, in a moment of vision, looks at1 those Situations which are possible in one's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole as disclosed in our anticipation of [zum] death. [346]

Only an entity which, in accordance with the meaning of its Being, finds itself in a state-of-mind [sich befindet]-that is to say, an entity, which in existing, is as already having been, and which exists in a constant mode of what has been-can become affected. Ontologically such affection presupposes making-present, and indeed in such a manner that in this making-present Dasein can be brought back to itself as something that has been. It remains a problem in itself to define ontologically the way in which the senses can be stimulated or touched in something that merely has life, and how and where2 the Being of animals, for instance, is constituted by some kind of 'time'.

(c) The Temporality ofFallingviii

In our temporal Interpretation of understanding and state-of-mind, we not only have come up against a primary ecstasis for each of these phenomena, but at the same time· we have always come up against temporality as a whole. Just as understanding is made possible primarily by

1 '... die augenblicklich ist auf ...'

2 '... wie und wo ...' The earlier editions have '... wie und ob ...' ('... how and whether ...').